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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

THOMAS HOWARD SMITH,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 200100817-CA

:
BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal isfroma judgment and conviction of willful evasion of income tax, a
second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-1101(l)(c) (1995), and
failure to file a tax return, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-81101(l)(b) (1995) (R. 861-63). This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under Utah
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (Supp. 2002).

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
1. Did the trial court properly reject defendant's claim that his two
convictions should have merged where the two offenses were based on different
conduct?

Because the claim was not properly preserved for appellate review, there is no
standard of review to apply.
2. Did the trial court properly refuse to give the jury a separate instruction
on defendant's "good faith" defense where the evidence belied defendant's "good
faith," and the instructions given adequately instructed the jury on the State's
burden of proof?
Whether a trial court erred in refusing to give a proposed jury instruction is a
question of law reviewed for correctness. State v. Stringham, 2001 UT App 13, f 11,17
P.3d 1153. However, jury instructions regarding a good faith defense are surplusage and
refusal to give them is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. Id. at ^ 21
(*"[W]e commend to the district judges in the exercise of their discretion [the good faith
instruction's] use as a supplement to the knowing and willful charge in future cases/"
(quoting United States v. Gross, 961 F.2d 1097,1103 (3rd Cir. 1992) (alteration in
original)).
3. Was the evidence sufficient to support both convictions?
To prevail on a claim of insufficient evidence, defendant must '"marshal the
evidence in support of the verdict and then demonstrate that the evidence is insufficient
when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict.'" State v. Silva9 2000 UT App
292, f 25,13 P.3d 604 (quoting State v. Rudolph, 2000 UT App 155, f 18, 3 P.3d 192)
(additional quotations omitted); see also State v. Vessey, 967 P.2d 960 (Utah App. 1998).
Evidence is sufficient if "'the evidence and all inferences that can be reasonably drawn
2

from it [establish that] some evidence exists from which a reasonable jury couldfindthat
the elements of the crime had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.'" Stringham, 2001
UT App 13, at f 26 (quoting State v. Kihlstrom, 1999 UT App 289, f 8, 988 P.2d 949,
cert, denied, 4 P.3d 1289 (Utah 2000)) (additional quotations omitted).
4. Did the trial court retain jurisdiction to enter an order of restitution
against defendant?
Whether or not a court has jurisdiction is a question of law which this Court
reviews without deference to the trial court. Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc. v. Melvin,
2000 UT App 110,18,2 P.3d 451.
5. Should this Court review defendant's claim that he is entitled to a hearing
regarding the imposition of restitution where he did not request a hearing from the
court below and, in fact, expressly waived his right to a hearing?
No standard of review applies to this issue.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES. AND RULES
The following relevant statutes are reproduced in Addendum A:
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402 (1999), and Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-1101 (1995).
The following relevant rules and statutes are reproduced in Addendum E:
Utah R. Crim. P. 2;
Utah R. Civ. P. 59;

Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 (1999);
Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-302 (Supp. 2001);

Utah R. App. P. 4.
The following relevant statute is reproduced in Addendum F:
Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-301 (Supp. 2001).
3

STATEMENT OF THE CASE1
Defendant was charged by information with one count of failing to file a tax
return, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-1101(1 )(b) (1995),
and one count of willful evasion of income tax, a second degree felony, in violation of
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-1101(l)(c) (1995) (R. 1-3). Both charges concerned only the
1995 tax year (R. 1-3). At a preliminary hearing, defendant asked to be allowed to
represent himself (R. 193-94). The court acquiesced after conducting an extensive
colloquy with defendant to insure that he understood hisrightsand the risks involved in
self-representation (R. 194). The court also appointed standby counsel (R. 193).
After a three-day trial, a jury convicted defendant on both counts (R. 589-90). The
court entered judgment on September 7,2001, and sentenced defendant to concurrent
prison terms of zero-to-five years for Count I, and one-to-fifteen years for Count II, as
well as imposing respective fines of $1000 and $2500 (R. 861-62; R. 959:22-23). The
court suspended the prison terms, placed defendant on probation, and ordered him to
cooperate with the Utah State Tax Commission ["Tax Commission"] and tofiletax
returns for all years requested (R. 861). Defendantfileda timely appeal pro se (R. 859).
A few days later counsel for defendant filed a motion to strike defendant's pro se
appeal (R. 866). Defendant filed a second timely notice of appeal from the September 7th
sentencing order on September 25,2001 (R. 888). On September 21, 2001, the State filed
l

This case has a ler *hy procedural history given the large number of pro se filings
made below. This brief re . ences only those events which are pertinent to the appeal.
4

a Motion to Clarify the Sentencing Order in which it requested inter alia that the court
impose $6,105.94 in restitution (R. 881-83). The court entered a restitution order on
September 26, 2001 (R. 896-97). Defendant filed an objection to the restitution order on
September 28, 2001 (R. 898-908). Counsel for defendant filed an appealfromthe
September 26 order on October 22, 2001 (R. 923). Both appeals were consolidated by
order of this Court dated August 21, 2002.2
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendant's income and personal expenses in 1995
In 1995, defendant operated a businessfromhis home providing clients with tax
assistance, bankruptcy kits, and legal research (R. 934:69-72, 87-89; R. 935:129, 131,
147-51, 153-55,251-52). Defendant used an office in his home to receive clients and
prepare their tax paperwork (R. 934:69-73,92-94; R. 935:129,131-32,137-38,153).
Clients usually paid defendant for his services by check made payable to the F. O. I. A.
Research Center, the Citizen's Legal Library Trust, or John Haas Burrell, and defendant
deposited the money into the corresponding bank account (R. 934:81,90; R. 935:252,
279; State's Ex. No. 8). Occasionally, payments were made payable directly to defendant
and deposited into one of the three accounts (R. 935:282; State's Ex. No. 8).

2

Prior to consolidation of the appeals, defendant filed an opening brief in each
appeal. The State responds to both briefs, citing to them herein as "Br. 1 of Aplt."
(originally case no. 20010817-CA) and "Br. 2 of Aplt" (originally case no. 20010856).
5

Defendant was the sole signatory on the bank account for John Haas Burrell, and
was a co-signatory on the other two accounts (R. 935:202-03; State's Ex. Nos. 7, 9, 10).3
The other co-signatory on the latter two accounts was Darwin Mertin (R. 935:195, 201).
Mr. Mertin is defendant's cousin and personal assistant and helped defendant with the
operation of defendant's business; however, defendant was in charge of and managed the
business (R. 935:153, 155, 160).
In 1998 bankruptcy proceedings unrelated to this appeal, defendant claimed that
his 1995 income from employment or operation of a business was $10,500 (R. 935:299).
However, the total deposits into the three bank accounts in 1995 was $66,862.58 (R.
935:289).
In 1992, defendant purchased a mobile home on contract (R. 935:123-24).
Defendant stated that in 1995, the balance on the mortgage was $7500 (R. 935:302). In
1995, defendant paid the balance on the mortgage and rent for space in a mobile home
park with checks drawn on the F.O.I.A. Research Center bank account (R. 935:133-34;
State's Ex. Nos, 3, 8). Defendant also paid his 1995 water and electricity bills, as well as
other utilities connected to his home, using checks drawn on the F.Oi.A. Research Center

3

Defendant signed the signature card on the John Haas Burrell account as "Thomas
Smith as custodian for John Haas Burrell" (R. 935:201). Defendant claimed that Mr.
Burrell is afriendof his who is in prison in Tennessee, and that Mr. Burrell asked
defendant to set up a checking account undfcr Mr. Burrell's name and social security
number to facilitate disbursement of a monthly income check (R. 936:506-07). Mr.
Burrell allegedly authorized defendant to use the funds personally in exchange for
defendant's services to Mr. Burrell (id.).

6

account (R. 935:135-36; State's Ex. No. 8). Defendant's daughter received orthodontic
treatment in 1995 from Dr. Charles Jackson (R. 935:175). Dr. Jackson's records
indicated that defendant was responsible for his daughter's orthodontic bills, that those
bills were paid regularly in 1995, and that at least one check wasfromthe Burrell account
(R. 935:175,179; R. 936:499; State's Ex. No. 4). Defendant also drew checksfromthe
three business accounts to pay personal grocery bills at Ream's, Dan's Food, and Smith's
grocery stores (R. 935:258).
Investigations bv the Utah State Tax Commission
Defendant stopped filing tax returns with the Utah State Tax Commission in 1987
(R. 935:278). The Commission performed non-filing audits on defendant for the years
1993-1995 (R. 935:221-22). Defendant petitioned for a redetermination of the tax
assessed against him for those years, but he never appeared for the hearing and a default
order was entered against him (R. 935:223).
The Tax Commission's criminal division began investigating defendant in 1999
(R. 935:276). The investigator, Dorothy Akins, determinedfrombank records that
defendant was running a businessfromhis home and paying his personal expenses with
the business incomefrombank accounts in the names of F.O.I. A. Research Center, the
Citizen's Legal Library Trust, and John Haas Burrell (R. 935:276,279-81, 285-86).
Akins determinedfromthe deposits that his gross income for 1995 was $66,862.58 (R.
935:289). She subtracted non-income transactions totaling $5,628.95 to arrive at an

7

adjusted gross income of $61,233.63 (R. 935:290).4 Akins then used defendant's adjusted
gross income, marital status, and number of dependants to determine that defendant's
taxable income for 1995 was $45,308.65 (R. 935:292-94). The Tax Commission's
estimate of defendant's taxable income did not include deductions for business or other
deductible expenses because defendant did not file a tax return or appear for a
redetermination hearing, leaving the Commission with no information on deductions (R.
935:309, 323). Defendant admits he did not file a tax return or pay income taxes for 1995
(R. 935:302, 338, 366; R. 936:504). The State then filed this case (R. 1-2).
Defendant's unique views of tax law
Defendant began studying tax law on his own in 1993 (R. 936:492). He read
several books, read the Internal Revenue Code and Title 59 of the Utah Code, and joined
an organization purporting to provide research on tax laws (R. 443-75). Defendant
concluded that he was not "a person who's required to file a tax return" because he could
not find in the Internal Revenue Code the "exact specific statute that requires a person to
file an income tax return and pay a tax" (R. 936:446,448). Defendant also believed that
if no federal tax return is required, then no State return need be filed (R. 964:12-13).
Before 1995, defendant had asserted his tax theories numerous times before
administrative law judges for the Tax Commission on behalf of individuals who chose not

4

Non-income transactions are transactions that are not attributable to defendant as
income for tax purposes, such as transfers between bank accounts, bank charges, and
money paid to anyone other than defendant (R. 935:290).
8

to file valid tax returns in reliance on defendant's theories (R. 935:223; R. 936:483-84,
495-96). At those hearings, and in subsequent decision letters sent to defendant, the civil
tax division and the administrative law judges rejected defendant's arguments and
instructed defendant on correct principles of tax law (R. 935:226-27; R. 936:483-84). On
at least three other occasions, defendant appeared before Judge Dee Benson of the United
States District Court for the District of Utah on tax-related matters (R. 936:489-90, 49299). Judge Benson heard and rejected defendant's theories (R. 936:489-91). At one
point, Judge Benson explained, "[Y]ou have made some of the most asinine arguments
I've ever heard as a federal judge and I don't know if you think they are cute or smart or
talented, I don't know; but they have so little merit, so little credibility" (R. 936:491).
Defendant admitted that his theories differfromthe conclusions of judges he has
appeared before and that he does not understand tax law as well as they do (R. 936:484).
Defendant's novel tax theories did not comport with those of his appointed counsel
(R. 68-69). Specifically, defendant sought new counsel below because "[counsel]... is
of the opinion and belief that if one has income one is required to file a tax returnf,]"
making counsel biased in favor of the prosecution and preventing himfromproviding a
vigorous defense (id). The court denied defendant's request for new counsel but
permitted defendant to proceed pro se with standby counsel (R. 79, 194).
Five different times before trial, defendant attempted to use his tax theories to
summarily dispose of the prosecution by filing various motions, including: three motions
to dismiss, one Summary Motion & Memorandum to Dismiss Ex Parte, and one Request
9

for Declaratory Judgement, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (R. 51-63, 292-314,
325-29,413-19). Defendant's grounds for dismissal included: 1) the Tax Commission
denied him an administrative hearing regarding the audit;5 2) defendant was not required
to file a federal tax return and therefore was not required to file a state tax return; 3) the
state court usurped the jurisdiction of a federal court; and 4) the Sixteenth Amendment of
the United States Constitution did not permit states to tax "anything, anywhere, anytime"
(R. 51-63,292-314, 325-29,413-19). When the court denied defendant's motions,
defendant attempted to remove the case to federal court, arguing that the case turned on
whether he was required to file a federal return, which, in his view, was a federal question
(R. 431-36). The federal court summarily referred the matter back to the state court (R.
437-38).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
POINT I: This Court should refuse to reach the merits of defendant's claim that
his convictions should have merged because he did not properly raise it below.
Defendant argued pretrial that the two charges merged; he never argued that the two
convictions merged- The merger doctrine has no application to mere charges, and the trial
court was not asked to review the issue following defendant's conviction. Further,
defendant presents no plain error or exceptional circumstances argument on appeal.

5

Mericia Milligan, an auditor for the Tax Commission, testified that defendant
requested a redetermination hearing for his tax assessment but that he failed to appear on
the scheduled date (R. 935:223).
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Even on the merits, the claim fails. Defendant claims that his two convictions
should merge because the offenses share a lesser-included relationship and because they
arise from a single criminal episode. However, he fails to recognize that his convictions
rest on distinct conduct separated by time and intervening circumstances. His active
concealment of his income, which formed the basis of his subsection (c) convictions, is
not an element of the subsection (b) conviction. Likewise, the failure to file a tax return
under subsection (b) is irrelevant to his conviction under subsection (c). Hence, the
convictions required proof of different elements in this case, and merger is not
appropriate.
POINT II: The absence of a jury instruction explaining that defendant may have
harbored a "good faith" misunderstanding of the law which led him to believe he did not
have to file a tax return in 1995 does not undermine defendant's convictions. Contrary to
defendant's claim, no such instruction is mandated. Moreover, such an instruction is
unnecessary where, as here, the other instructions on willfulness adequately explained the
State's burden of proof as to the elements of the crimes. Finally, the evidence belies any
such good faith belief on defendant's part where he had advanced his position on the tax
laws repeatedly before administrative law judges for the Utah State Tax Commission and
at least one federal judge, only to have his position wholly rejected. Further, his own
research materials contain a copy of a Utah Supreme Court case from 1992 which flatly
rejects defendant's primary defense. His irrational refusal to accept the repeated
rejections of his position prevents any finding of a "good faith" misunderstanding.
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POINT HI: Defendant's pro se claim of insufficient evidence is frivolous. He
argues that both his convictions are based on insufficient evidence because there was no
proof that he was required to file a federal tax return for 1995, which requirement he
claims is a necessary prerequisite to the State tax charges against him. No such proof is
required for either conviction.
POINT IV: The trial court retained jurisdiction to order defendant to pay
restitution. Where a defendant's crimes have resulted in pecuniary damages, the court
must impose restitution, but may defer setting the amount where "the complication and
prolongation of the sentencing process . . . substantially outweighs the need to provide
restitution to the victim/9 In this case, the district court's failure to impose restitution at
the time of sentencing may be reasonably viewed as a deferral in setting restitution,
permitting the court to wait until defendant complied with the sentencing requirement of
filing the necessary information with the Tax Commission from which to derive a sum
certain. In the alternative, the State's motion was a timely rule 59(e) motion to amend the
judgment that tolled the time for filing an appeal, and the district court therefore had
jurisdiction to rule on the motion.
POINT V: This Court should reject defendant's unpreserved claim that the trial
court erroneously denied him a restitution hearing because defendant did not request a
hearing below, did not challenge the imposition of restitution, expressly waived his right
to a hearing, and, in any event, invited any error found to exist. Defendant has waived his
claim that the trial court failed to include specific findings in support of the restitution
12

order where he did not raise this claim below, and he has not established plain error on
appeal.
ARGUMENTS
POINT I
MERGER IS NOT PROPER UNDER THE FACTS OF THIS CASE
BECAUSE DEFENDANT'S CONVICTIONS WERE BASED ON
INDEPENDENT ACTS, AND PROOF OF ONE OFFENSE WAS NOT
REQUIRED TO CONVICT ON THE OTHER
Defendant claims that his two tax-related convictions should have merged under
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402 (1995). Br. 1 of Aplt. at 8. Specifically, he claims that
subsections (b) and (c) of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-1101(1) "proscribe essentially the same
conduct" and that defendant's failure to file his 1995 tax return and his failure to pay tax
that year was part of a single criminal episode which should result in a single conviction.
Br. 1 of Aplt. at 8, 11-23.
Defendant's argument fails for two reasons. First, he waived the issue by failing to
properly raise it below. Second, his convictions do not merge because the variations of
the crimes established in this case have unique elements and therefore do not have a
lesser-included offense relationship.
A.

This Court should refuse to reach the merits of defendant's claim because he
did not properly preserve the issue for appellate review.
"As a general rule, claims not raised before the trial court may not be raised on

appeal." State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, f 11,10 P.3d 346. "This rule applies to every
claim, including constitutional questions

" Id. The Utah Supreme Court has
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reaffirmed that principle in the context of a merger claim. See State v. Finlay son, 2000
UT 10 H[ 8-10, 994 P.2d 1243 ("Finlayson IF) (finding that the court of appeals had
incorrectly reached a merger claim raised for the first time on appeal under rule 22(e),
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure; the Court then reached the issued under ineffective
assistance of counsel).
Defendant represented himself at trial with court-appointed standby counsel (R.
194). At a recess during the presentation of defendant's case-in-chief, defendant made a
"Motion to Dismiss Multiplicious [sic] Charge in Amended Information" (R. 595-602; R.
936:509-31) (supporting memorandum is in Add. B). He claims that this motion
preserved his merger claim for appeal. Br. 1 of Aplt. at 3-4. Defendant claimed in the
motion that both counts charged the same conduct and that the separate subsections of the
statute existed only to increase the State's chances of convicting defendant (R. 936:52829). He supported the motion with several casesfromthe Fifth Circuit and one case from
Utah's Eighth Judicial District Court (R. 603-19; R. 936:510, 512). The State responded
that the motion should be denied because it was made after the motion deadline, Fifth
Circuit decisions are not binding on Utah courts, and the statutes have separate elements,
separate penalties, and cover separate conduct (R. 936:509-12). The trial court denied the
motion, ruling that the State had properly charged two separate counts (R. 936:529) (in
Add. B).
Setting aside the issue of whether defendant's claim of multiplicity permitted the
trial court to adequately consider the doctrine of merger, defendant's claim is nevertheless
14

unpreserved because it was made pre-conviction. See State v. Hawatmeh, 2001 UT 51, <[
17,n.3,26P.3d223.
In Hawatmeh, the Court was presented with the State's interlocutory appeal from
the trial court's refusal to bind multiple defendants over on the charge of aggravated
kidnaping. Id. at % 1. The State had charged defendants with both aggravated kidnaping
and assault, and the trial court refused to bind them over on the aggravated kidnaping
charge because the kidnaping was incidental to the assault and thus merged with the
underlying assault. Id. at f 17, n.3. In reversing the trial court, the Utah Supreme Court
noted that the merger doctrine did not apply because the matter involved "charges"
instead of "convictions." Id. The clear implicationfromthe Court's note is that a trial
court cannot properly consider the issue of merger until after a jury has rendered its
verdict and defendant is subject to multiple convictions for the same criminal act. See
also Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(1) (1999) (providing that it is the "acquittal or
conviction and sentence" under one provision of the code that "bars a prosecution under
any other such provision").
Moreover, defendant does not argue that his merger claim is reviewable under
either plain error or ineffective assistance of counsel. This Court should therefore decline
to address this issue. See Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ^| 11; State v. Pledger, 896 P.2d 1225,
1229 n.5 (Utah 1995) (declining to review issue not raised below when appellant did not
argue either plain error or exceptional circumstances).
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B.

Defendant's claim fails on the merits because under the facts in this case the
offenses are not included offenses, rendering merger inapplicable.
Even if this Court reaches the merger issue, it will find that defendant's argument

lacks merit. Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(3) (1999) (in Add. A) bars conviction for two
offenses arising out of a single criminal episode when one is a lesser included offense of
the other. See also State v. Brooks, 908 P.2d 856, 861 (Utah 1995).
Merger is proper if a defendant is convicted of both a charged offense and a lesser
included offense. Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(3) (1999) (in Add. A). The Utah Supreme
Court has adopted a two-step analysis to determine whether two offenses have the
relationship of greater and lesser included offenses for purposes of merger under Utah
Code Ann. § 76-1-402(3). See Brooks, 908 P.2d at 861; State v. Hill, 674 P.2d 96,97
(Utah 1983). "[T|he first step is a purely theoretical comparison of the statutory elements
of each offense." Brooks, 908 P.2d at 861; Hill, 674 P.2d at 97. When examining the
elements, an offense is viewed as a lesser included offense when: "(a) It is established by
the same or less than all the facts required to establish the commission of the offense
charged . . . . " Utah Code Ann. 76-1-402(3); see also Blockburger v. United States, 284
U.S. 299 (1932); McCovey, 803 P.2d at 1235-36; State v. Yanez, 2002 UT App 50,121,
42 P.3d 1248.
Some criminal statutes, however, have multiple variations or elements, so that a
greater-lesser relationship may exist between some variations of the crimes, but not
others. Brooks, 908 P.2d at 861; Hill, 674 P.2d at 98. In such a case, the court must look
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to the evidence presented at trial to determine what variation of the crime or crimes was
proved and then "look[] to the statutory elements of the crime to determine whether it is
an included offense." Finlayson II, 2000 UT 10, at \ 16. Accord Brooks, 908 P.2d at
861-62; Hill, 674 P.2d at 97; State v. Pierson, 2000 UT App 274, % 12, 12 P.3d 103. The
court need reach this step, however, only if, after comparing the statutory elements, it
cannot "categorically say that [the crimes] will never have a lesser included relationship."
Brooks, 908 P.2d at 861-62.
1. Subsections (b) and (c) of section 76-8-1101(1) mav be established bv
proof of different facts.
A review of the language of subsections (b) and (c) of Utah Code Ann. § 76-81101(1) (1995) demonstrates that the offenses have common elements that could permit
the same conduct to constitute a chargeable offense under both subsections.
A person violates subsection (b) if:
1) they fail to file a tax return or file a false return;
2) with the intent to evade
a) any tax;
b) any requirement of Title 59; or
c) any lawful requirement of the State Tax Commission.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-1101(l)(b) (in Add. A).
A person violates subsection (c) if they "willfully attempt to evade or defeat any
tax or the payment thereof

" Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-1101(1 )(c) (in Add. A).

A comparison of the elements of these statutes establishes that each subsection
could be violated by the willful failure to file a tax return to avoid paying taxes.
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However, each statute may be violated in more than one way, requiring that this Court
reach the second step of the merger analysis. Under that analysis, it becomes clear that
the offenses, as established in this case, do not share a lesser-included relationship.
Defendant was charged and convicted under subsection (b) for his willful failure to
file his 1995 tax return in order to avoid payment of taxes owed for that year (R. 359-63).
However, he was charged and convicted under subsection (c) for his repeated willful
attempts to hide his income from the Tax Commission and avoid paying taxes by
depositing it in several bank accounts from which he paid his personal expenses (id.).
The distinction between the charges was made clear by the prosecutor in the bill of
particulars as well as throughout the trial and in closing argument (R. 359-63; R. 934:81,
90; R. 935:202-03,252,279,282; R. 965:28-30; State's Ex. Nos. 7-10).6
As proved at trial, these offenses share a common intent and tax year. However,
defendant's act of failing to file his tax return under subsection (b) is an element not
required for the variation of willful evasion under subsection (c) that was proved at trial.

6

During closing arguments, after discussing defendant's failure to file an income
tax return, the prosecutor said the following (R. 965:30):
Count 2, the willful evasion of taxes. That he willfully attempted to evade or
defeat a tax, again, we're talking about income tax, but that's different and
it's not just filing. That's all this. The Citizen Legal Library, F.I.O.A., John
Berrellfsic], Dr. Sines, people coming and going from the house. I don't
believe in paying taxes. If I do things a certain way, they're going to tax me
on it. Separate lines, all that sort of thing.
That's-ultimately, those are the acts of willfully evading.
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On the other hand, the offense of failure to file a tax return under subsection (b) cannot be
established by proof that a defendant put his income in bank accounts purportedly
belonging to others throughout the course of the tax year at issue. Thus, proof of the
offense of failure to file a tax return does not prove all the elements required for the
variation of evasion of taxes relevant to this case and vice versa. Accordingly, the
variations of these two crimes established in this case do not share a lesser-included
relationship as each possesses a unique element. See Brooks, 908 P.2d at 862.
Because willful evasion of taxes and failure to file a tax return under the facts in
this case do not stand in a lesser-included relationship, the two crimes do not merge under
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(3).
2, This Court does not need to look outside the state of Utah to resolve
the issue.
Defendant goes beyond the plain language of the statute and the facts of this case,
arguing that this Court should adopt the federal interpretation of similarly worded
criminal statutes because Title 59 was enacted to conform Utah's administration of its
income tax laws and the requisite rules of procedure with the federal system. Br. 1 of
Aplt. at 17-21. The federal interpretation, he claims, would result in application of the
merger doctrine. Id. This Court should decline to consider defendant's analysis because
defendant provides no reason for the Court to adopt the non-binding decisions of various
federal appellate courts when Utah has an ample, readily-available, controlling body of
statutes and case law concerning merger.
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However, even when considered under federal law, as defendant advocates, the
facts under this case do not warrant merger. Federal courts follow the same test under
Blockburger as does the state of Utah. See subpoint B, supra. Under federal law, the
merger of offenses is fact sensitive, and two offenses may enjoy an included-offense
relationship under one set of facts but not under another. See United States v. Kaiser, 893
F.2d 1300, 1304 (5th Cir. 1990) (stating that Court follows Blockburger rule that
determines, absent specific statutory authorization of cumulative punishment, whether
"offenses are sufficiently distinguishable to permit the imposition of cumulative
punishment"); United States v. Buckley, 586 F.2d 498, 504 (5th Cir. 1978) (holding that
convictions for tax evasion and failure to file a return must merge where government
relies on failure tofiletax return as basis for both offenses); United States v. Reynolds,
288 F.2d 78 (5th Cir. 1961) ("Congress did not intend that an attempt to evade the tax
would necessarily merge in the offense of failing to pay the tax.").
The federal equivalents of sections 76-8-1101(b) and 76-8-1101(c) are 26
U.S.C.A. §§ 7203 and 7201 (Supp. 2001), respectively (in Add. A).7 Under the federal
scheme, section 7203 may be viewed as a lesser included offense of section 7201. See
United States v. Doyle, 956 F.2d 73,75 (5th Cir. 1992). Section 7203 is a misdemeanor
offense and only punishes u<[w]illful but passive neglect of the statutory duty," i.e.,
crimes such as willfully failing to file a return or willfully failing to pay taxes. Id.

7

26 U.S.C.A. § 7203 has not been amended since 1990.
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(quoting Spies v. United States, 317 U.S. 492, 498-99 (1943)). Section 7201 is a felony
offense that punishes " ; a willful and positive attempt to evade tax

'" Id. (quoting

Spies, 317 U.S. at 498-99).
Defendant correctly asserts that under federal law, a person cannot be convicted of
both felony income tax evasion and misdemeanor failure to file an income tax return
when the only criminal act supporting the convictions is the willful failure tofilea tax
return. Br. 1 of Aplt. at 17-21. But those are not the facts at hand. Defendant's
convictions rest on two criminal acts: 1) failing tofilea tax return; and 2) hiding income
in various trust accounts in order to avoid paying taxes on that income. Under the federal
scheme, defendant's act of hiding income would be an affirmative act punishable under
26 U.S.C.A. § 7201 (see United States v. Carlson, 235 F.3d 466,468-69 (9th Cir. 2000)),
and defendant's act of failing to file a tax return would be a separate misdemeanor
punishable under 26 U.S.C.A. § 7203 (see Doyle, 956 F.2d at 75). Hence, defendant's
reliance on federal law is not only unnecessary in this case, but would result in affirmance
of his convictions.
£a

Defendant was not convicted twice for the same act occurring in a single
criminal episode.
Defendant contends that he is entitled to have one of his convictions vacated on the

ground that his conduct "supported a single plan that should have been charged as a
single offense." Br. 1 of Aplt. at 23. He argues that under the single criminal episode
doctrine set forth in section 76-1-402(1), the conduct upon which both of his convictions
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were based—failure to file a tax return or to pay taxes—was part of a single objective or
event and warranted only one conviction. Br. 1 of Aplt. at 22-23. However, defendant
again fails to take into account the actual evidence upon which his convictions were based
and the fact that his two convictions stemmed from different conduct.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(1) provides that if "the same act of a defendant under
a single criminal episode shall establish offenses which may be punished in different
ways under different provisions of [the] code," and defendant is prosecuted and convicted
under multiple provisions of the code for that act, then "the act shall be punishable under
only one such provision

" Add. A. In other words, a defendant may be prosecuted

and punished for all crimes committed within a single criminal episode so long as they
each arisefromseparate acts. See State v. O'Brien, 721 P.2d 896,900 (Utah 1986)
(referring to the first paragraph of the statute).
Defendant argues that tax evasion under both subsections "could be accomplished
by failing to file a return, or filing afraudulentreturn" and that, "[i]n this case, [he]
allegedly evaded the tax by failing to file a return." Br. 1 of Aplt. at 23. Defendant again
ignores the fact that the conviction under subsection (c) was based on conduct not
necessary to his conviction under subsection (b) and vice versa. See subsection Bl,
supra. Further, the conduct charged and proven by the State which formed the basis of
the two convictions was separated by time and intervening circumstances. The
conviction under subsection (c) was based on deposits into and withdrawals from the
various bank accounts which occurred throughout 1995 as the income was earned and the
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debts it paid were incurred (R. 935:133-36, 175, 179, 258; R. 936:499; State's Ex. Nos. 3,
4, 8). The conviction under subsection (b) was based on defendant's intentional failure to
file the appropriate return on or before the filing deadline of that year. See Br. 1 of Aplt.
at 22. Consequently, defendant was not convicted twice for the same act, and his
argument fails. See State v. Smathers, 602 P.2d 708, 710 (Utah 1979) (conduct prohibited
under the rape statute is not conduct prohibited under the aggravated sexual assault
statute, permitting two convictions).
Defendant cites to State v. Kimbel, 620 P.2d 515 (Utah 1980), and State v. Crosby,
927 P.2d 638 (Utah 1996), in support of his claim that the two separate convictions
amount to a single criminal violation. Br. 1 of Aplt. at 21-22. Those cases, however,
involved thefts committed under a continuing scheme. The Kimbel test has not been
extended beyond theft or embezzlement cases. See State v. Patience, 944 P.2d 381, 390
(Utah App. 1997). In Patience, this Court refused to apply the Kimbel test to forgery
cases even if the forgeries were committed in the course of a continuous transaction,
holding instead that a defendant could be convicted for each document forged. Id.
Indeed, while the Supreme Court in Crosby required the theft charges to be consolidated,
it did not preclude the separate conviction of a single forgery charge, even though it
appears the objective was the same, i.e., to misappropriate company funds. See Crosby,
927 P.2d at 645-46. In short, the Kimbel test is a narrow exception to section 76-1-402.
Defendant has not demonstrated that the exception is warranted here.
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Because defendant's convictions were based on separate acts, defendant was
appropriately convicted of and punished for both offenses under section 76-1-402. See
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402; see also O 'Brien, 721 P.2d at 900 (where aggravated
burglary and theft were committed during a single criminal episode but were the result of
separate and distinct acts, the acts resulted in separate and distinct crimes, and the trial
judge was within his discretion to sentence defendants for four separate crimes); State v.
Mane, 783 P.2d 61,66 (Utah App. 1989) (defendant's conduct during a single criminal
episode, which encompassed four victims, consisted of separate "acts" and permitted
conviction and punishment for each act).

POINT B

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY INSTRUCTED THE JURY ON
THE RELEVANT LAW, AND DEFENDANT WAS NOT ENTITLED
TO A SEPARATE INSTRUCTION ON "GOOD FAITH"
Defendant claims that the trial court erred by refusing to submit his proposed jury
instruction on his defense of good faith misunderstanding of the law. Br. 1 of Aplt. at 2544. Defendant's good faith instruction was unnecessary because: 1) the jury instructions
adequately instructed the jury on the State's burden to prove the elements of the crimes;
and 2) there was no reasonable basis in the evidence for the jury to find defendant's belief
was in good faith.
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A.

The United States Supreme Court has not mandated the giving of a "good
faith55 instruction whenever a defendant raises a "good faith1' defense in a tax
case.
Defendant builds his argument around a United States Supreme Court case which

does not support his position. See Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192 (1991) (in Add.
C). Cheek held that a defendant is entitled to assert as a defense in a tax evasion case a
good faith belief that the tax laws do not impose a duty on him. Id. at 206-07. Defendant
asserts that this holding entitles him to an instruction on "good faith." Br. 1 of Aplt. at
30, 35. In Cheek, however, the trial court issued a jury instruction on good faith, so that
the question of whether or not a good faith instruction was required was not before the
Court. 498 U.S. at 196-97. The question considered in Cheek was only whether the trial
court's supplemental instructions on good faith correctly stated the law. Id. at 198-99.
Moreover, the Cheek Court acknowledged, without criticism, its own holding in United
States v. Pomponio, 429 U.S. 10 (1976), issued fifteen years earlier, that "after instructing
the jury on willfulness, *[a]n additional instruction on good faith was unnecessary.'"
Cheek, 498 U.S. at 201 (quoting Pomponio, 429 U.S. at 12) (alteration in original).
Consequently, Cheek does not require the giving of a "good faith" instruction in every
case. As explained below, such an instruction was unnecessary in this case. See
subsections B and C, infra.
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B.

Utah law does not require a good faith instruction where other instructions
adequately instruct the iurv on the State's burden of proof as to the charged
crimes.
Consistent with the Supreme Court's holding in Pomponio, this Court held in State

v. Stringham that good faith instructions are unnecessary if other instructions on
willfulness adequately explain "the government's burden to prove the elements of the
crime

" 2001 UT App 13, f 20,17 PJd 1153. This holding is also consistent with

the rule that '"[fjailure to give requested jury instructions constitutes reversible error only
if their omission tends to mislead the jury to the prejudice of the complaining party or
insufficiently or erroneously advises the jury on the law.'" Summerhill v. Shipley, 890
P.2d 1042,1044 (Utah App, 1995) (quoting Biswell v. Duncan, 742 P.2d 80, 88 (Utah
App. 1987)). A good faith defense serves only to contradict the State's evidence of
willfulness and adds nothing new to the elements of the crime. Thus, where the jury is
properly instructed on the element of willfulness, the "'good faith instruction is simply a
redundant version of the instruction on [that] elementf].'" Stringham, 2001 UT App 13, at
1f 20 (quoting United States v. Gross, 961 F.2d 1097,1103 (3rd Cir. 1992)).
The good faith instruction's propensity for redundancy has led this Court to adopt
the more deferential "abuse of discretion" standard used by the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals for reviewing a refusal to submit a good faith instruction- See Stringham, 2001
UT App 13, at f 21; see also Gross, 961 F.2d at 1101. "[W]e agree with the Third
Circuit's statement in Gross that in some cases it may be appropriate to give a good faith
instruction, but that it is 'not reversible error for the district court to refuse to give the
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good faith instruction . . . , we commend to the district judges in the exercise of their
discretion [the good faith instruction's] use as a supplement to the "knowing and willful"
charge in future cases.'" Stringham, 2001 UT App 13, at f 21 (quoting Gross, 961 F.2d at
1103) (alteration in original). An appellate court will find an abuse of discretion only
where there is no "reasonable basis in the record to support" the trial court's challenged
ruling. See State v. Coleman, 2001 UT App 281, f 3, 34 P.3d 790 (addressing a "good
cause" determination under the speedy trial statute) (quoting State v. Bonny, 25 Utah 2d
117, 477 P.2d 147, 148 (Utah 1970)).
In Stringham, the defendant was convicted of communicationsfraudand
racketeering. Stringham, 2001 UT App 13, at % 1. The communicationsfraudstatute
under which he was convicted, Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801 (1990), required the
prosecution to prove that defendant's misrepresentations were made "intentionally,
knowingly, or with a reckless disregard for the truth." Defendant appealed the
communicationsfraudconvictions on the ground that the trial court erred in refusing to
submit a good faith instruction to the jury. Stringham, 2001 UT App 13, at f 17. This
Court found the jury instructions regarding the crime's mens rea element to be
sufficiently complete so as to render a good faith instruction unnecessary. Id. at f 23.
Those instructions included the following: I) a statement of the elements of the crime,
including the required mental intent designated by the statute; and 2) definitions of
"intentionally," "knowingly," and "reckless disregard for the truth" that closely tracked
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the language of the statutory definitions in Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103 (1999).
Stringham, 2001 UT App 13, at f 22.
In the present case, the jury instructions were more complete than the instructions
found to be adequate in Stringham. Id. at f j 22-23. Instructions 33 and 34 explained the
elements of each crime and the State's burden of proof (R. 584-85) (in Add. D). They
both stated that the jury could convict defendant if it found from the evidence that "the
State has proven beyond a reasonable doubt each and every one of the following elements
" (id.). Add. D. The instructions then listed the elements of the crimes, including
that defendant acted "[i]ntentionally or [w]illfitlly" (id.). Add. D. Instruction 28 defined
willfulness for the jury: "A person engages in conduct: (1) Intentionally or with intent or
willfully with respect to the nature of his conduct or to a result of his conduct when it is
his conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result

" (R.

579) (in Add. D).
In addition, instructions 29 and 29 A explained the purpose of the evidence
regarding defendant's research of tax law. Instruction 29 stated,
The defendant has introduced evidence of advice he heard given by speakers
at meetings, tape recorded lectures, essays, pamphlets, court opinions, and
other material that he testified he relied on in concluding that he was not a
person required to file an income tax return for 1995. This evidence has been
admitted solely for the purpose of aiding you in determining whether or not the
defendant's failure to timely file a tax return for 1995 was knowing and willful
and you should not consider it for any other purpose.
(R. 580) (in Add. D). Instruction 29A stated, "You are instructed that the admission of
defendant's Exhibit £23 A-W is not entered into evidence for any substantive value but
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for the limited purpose of showing the defendant's state of mind on or about January 1,
1995 to April 16, 1996." (R. 581) (in Add. D).8 Thus, the jury was instructed not only on
the State's burden to prove willful intent and what willful intent meant, but also that
defendant had submitted evidence supporting his assertion that his evasion was not
willful. Accordingly, the jury instructions here were more complete than those upheld in
Stringham, and a good faith instruction would have been redundant. The trial court's
rejection of defendant's proposed instruction, therefore, did not amount to an abuse of
discretion.
£s

Defendant was not entitled to a separate good faith instruction because there
was no basis in the evidence for the jury tofinddefendant's belief was in good
faith.
In addition to being redundant, a good faith instruction in this case would have

been misleading because there was no rational basis in the evidence supporting a finding
that defendant's beliefs regarding taxes were held in good faith.
Defendant agrees that the standard for willfulness is the "voluntary, intentional
violation of a known legal duty." Cheek, 498 U.S. at 201 (cited in Br. 1 of Aplt. at 26). It
follows that if the jury credits defendant's conduct to a good faith misunderstanding of
the law, it must find him not guilty. Cheek, 498 U.S. at 202. However, the good faith
misunderstanding must rest on an arguable point of law. Hales Sand & Gravel Inc. v.
Audit Division of the State Tax Commission, 842 P.2d 887, 895 (Utah 1992); Chicago

defendant's exhibit #23 A-W consisted of the numerous volumes of tax-related
books upon which defendant claimed he relied in interpreting the tax laws.
29

Bridge & Iron Co. v. State Tax Commission, 839 P.2d 303, 309 (Utah 1992).
Additionally, one who holds an erroneous but good faith understanding and then is given
reason to doubt that understanding may longer hide behind the initial belief as a defense
to criminal prosecution. Nelson v. State Tax Comm % 903 P.2d 939, 940 (Utah 1995)
("Irrational and unsupported interpretations of the tax code will not justify circumvention
of the requirement to file and pay state taxes, especially when the Commission has
notified a resident of his or her duty to do so/'); cf. United States v. Mathes, 151 F.3d 251,
255 (5th Cir. 1998) (holding that defendant in prosecution for failure to pay child support
cannot assert defense of good faith misunderstanding based on advice from attorney when
defendant later learned that attorney was unfamiliar with the laws of the state).
Defendant testified at trial that he had read several books on the federal income tax
system and substantial portions of both the Internal Revenue Code and Title 59 of the
Utah Code (R. 443-75). He introduced into evidence five boxes of research material that
he had amassed, including several books he had read, copies of the Internal Revenue
Code for several years, and more than twenty binders of research from the "Research
Foundation" (Defendant's Ex. Nos. 23A-23W). Defendant concludedfromhis research
that he was not "a person who's required to file a tax return" because he was unable to
find in the Internal Revenue Code the "exact specific statute that requires a person to file
an income tax return and pay a tax" (R. 936:446,448). Defendant also asserted that he
was not required to file a state tax return because the state return used the gross income
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definition of the federal return, and he was not required to file a federal return (R. 964:1213).
Defendant's belief that he was not required to pay taxes was not in good faith
because he was expressly notified before 1995 that his understanding of tax law was
erroneous. Before 1995, defendant asserted his tax theories numerous times before
administrative law judges for the Utah State Tax Commission on behalf of individuals
who, in reliance on defendant's theories, failed to file valid tax returns (R. 935:223; R.
936:483-84, 495-96). On those occasions, the civil tax division and the administrative
law judges rejected defendant's arguments and instructed defendant on tax law (R.
935:226-27; R. 936:483-84). At least three times, defendant appeared before Judge Dee
Benson of the United States District Court for the District of Utah on tax-related matters
(R. 936:489-90,492-99). Judge Benson heard and rejected defendant's theories, noting
that they were without merit or credibility (R. 936: 489-91). Thus, prior to 1995,
defendant was repeatedly notified that his theories were wrong and that he was required
to file a tax return. Defendant nevertheless refused to accept that fact. Moreover, he has
given no justifiable basis for his stubborn adherence to his irrational beliefs.
Additionally, defendant's own research materials rebut his claim of good faith.
Defendant's exhibit number 23G is a binder on which he claims to have relied in reaching
his conclusion that he was not required to file a tax return or pay income taxes. The
second article in defendant's binder is a copy of Jensen v. State Tax Comm >i, 835 P.2d
965 (Utah 1992), in which the Utah Supreme Court flatly rejects defendant's primary
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argument: that because the federal government did not determine that he had tofilea
federal tax return, he was not obliged to file a state tax return. Id. at 969. Thus,
defendant's own research material put him on notice that his understanding of Title 59 of
the Utah Code was erroneous. Consequently, there was no reasonable basis in the
evidence upon which the jury could consider a "good faith" defense. Defendant was,
therefore, not entitled to his "good faith" instruction. See, e.g., State v. Knoll, 712 P.2d
211,214 (Utah 1985) (where there is no basis in the evidence which would provide a
reasonable basis for the jury to find that defendant acted in self defense, no such
instruction shall be given).

PQINT ffl
PROOF OF A FEDERAL DETERMINATION THAT DEFENDANT
MUST FILE A FEDERAL TAX RETURN IS NOT REQUIRED FOR
A CONVICTION OF FAILING TO FILE A STATE TAX RETURN
Defendant presents the third claim on his own behalf, arguing that the evidence
below was insufficient to support both his convictions.9 Defendant claims that before he
9

Prior to briefing this appeal, defense counsel requested that this Court permit
defendant tofilepro se appellate briefs in addition to those counsel intended to file. The
State opposed the motion and noted that defense counsel had identified herself in this
appeal as defendant's counsel until filing the request, at which point she identified herself
as "standby" counsel This Court determined that "[i]f Appellant wishes to raise issues
that [counsel] believes are meritless or otherwise unsupported, [counsel] should
incorporate those issues into its brief under the guidelines of Anders v. California. 386
U.S. 738 (1967) and State v. Clavton. 639 P.2d 168 (Utah 1981)." Order dated April 24,
2002 (in Add. E). In so doing, the Court twice identified defense counsel as "counsel of
record," not standby counsel. Id. Add. E.
Counsel responded by filing an opening brief in which she repeatedly refers to
herself as "standby counsel." Id. at cover, 1 & n.l, 3, 8-9. She also fully incorporates
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can be convicted of either charge, the State must prove that %4a federal trier of fact" has
determined that defendant was required to file a federal income tax return for 1995. Br. 1
of Aplt. at 47-48. However, neither charge requires proof of such an element.10
The assessment of a federal tax is independent of the duty to file a tax return, the
latter of which arises upon the earning of income. Jensen v. State Tax Commission, 835
P.2d 965, 970 (Utah 1992) ("[T]he duty to file a [tax] return arises when a person earns
income, not when his or her income is assessed for tax purposes."); see also Nelson v.
Auditing Div.t Utah State Tax Commission, 903 P.2d 939, 940 (Utah 1995). Regardless
of whether the federal government assessed income taxes against defendant, the evidence
established that in 1995, defendant earned income sufficient to require that he file a state
tax return and pay taxes, both of which he failed to do (R. 935: 294-99; R. 936: 365-67).
Accordingly, the absence of proof of any federal determination of the need for a federal
tax return for 1995 is irrelevant to defendant's convictions, and his claim of insufficient
evidence fails. See Jensen, 835 P.2d at 969-70.

defendant's frivolous issue into thefirstbrief, attributing the issue to defendant acting pro
se. Br. 1 of Aplt. at 1-2 n.l, 44-48. Counsel explains that she interprets Anders as
requiring a determination offrivolousnessas it relates to the entire appeal, not to
individual issues within an appeal. Id. at 1-2, n.l. As counsel did not believe the entire
appeal to be "whollyfrivolous,"she rejected Anders as inapplicable, apparently making
no determination as to the merit of defendant's pro se issue. Id. If that is the case, the
defense has circumvented this Court's order denying defendant's motion to file his own
pro se appellate briefs.
10

Defendant's argument centers around the act of filing a tax return. Br. 1 of Aplt.
at 47-48. Because only one of his convictions was based on this act, see Point 1(B)(2),
supra, the State addresses only that charge in its response to this argument.
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POINT IV
DEFENDANT'S NOTICE OF APPEAL DID NOT DEPRIVE THE
TRIAL COURT OF JURISDICTION TO ENTER THE
RESTITUTION ORDER WHERE RESTITUTION HAD BEEN
DEFERRED AT THE TIME OF SENTENCING; FURTHER, THE
STATE'S MOTION WAS A TIMELY 59(e) MOTION TO AMEND
THE JUDGMENT, PRESERVING THE TRIAL COURT'S
JURISDICTION TO ORDER RESTITUTION
Defendant alleges that the trial court did not impose restitution in its original
judgment and that the order setting restitution at $6,105.94 was a material change in the
judgment. Br. 2 of Aplt. at 13-16. Defendant then mistakenly claims that the State's
motion was untimely, and that his notice of appeal divested the trial court of jurisdiction
to amend the judgment to include restitution. Id. at 16-19. Defendant's argument first
fails because a trial court may, as it did here, defer setting restitution. Alternatively, the
State's motion was a timely motion to amend the sentence, tolling the time for filing an
appeal, rendering all notices of appeal filed before September 26 of no effect, and
permitting entry of the restitution order.
A.

The trial court intended that restitution be a part of defendant's
probation, but properly deferred setting restitution under Utah Code
Ann, § 77-3ga-3Q3(4)t
The trial court did not materially change defendant's sentence by entry of the

restitution order, but merely completed the sentence by imposing the mandatory
restitution that had been implicitly deferred at the formal sentencing hearing. Under
Utah's sentencing statute, the court has discretion to sentence a guilty defendant to a
variety of punishments listed in Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(2) (1999). Restitution is set
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apart from that selection of punishments and is mandatory. "When a defendant is
convicted of criminal activity that has resulted in pecuniary damages, in addition to any
other sentence it may impose, the court shall order that the defendant make restitution as
provided in this subsection

" Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-302(l) (Supp. 2001)

(emphasis added) (in Add. E); Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(4) (1999) (in Add. E); see
also State v. Stirba, 972 P.2d 918, 922 (Utah App. 1998) (restitution statute makes
restitution mandatory following a conviction); State v. Dickey, 841 P.2d 1203, 1207 (Utah
App. 1992) (stating that Utah statutes mandate court to order restitution when
appropriate).
A trial court need not enter a restitution order or consider restitution at the time of
sentencing. 'The court may decline to make an order or may defer entering an order of
restitution if the court determines that the complication and prolongation of the
sentencing process, as a result of considering an order of restitution under this subsection,
substantially outweighs the need to provide restitution to the victim." Utah Code Ann. §§
77-38a-302(5)(d) & 76-3-20l(8)(d). Add. E.
By its nature, the crime of tax evasion results in pecuniary damages and requires
restitution. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-302(l); see also Utah Code Ann. § 76-3201(4)(a)(i). Add. E. In few cases is a defendant's liability for pecuniary damages more
obvious than in a tax evasion case. The nature of the conviction is that defendant failed to
remit a sum of money owed to the State of Utah. Restitution is, therefore, necessarily part
of defendant's conviction for tax evasion.
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In the present case, the court did not expressly order restitution at sentencing as a
part of defendant's probation (R. 861-863). However, the implication from the
sentencing minutes and transcript, along with the presentence report and the nature of the
crimes, makes clear that restitution was to be imposed and would be a part of defendant's
probation. Where the State has provided the necessary information for the court to
consider restitution, and the nature of the crime (tax evasion) so obviously demands
restitution, the absence of a specific restitution determination at sentencing is not a denial
of restitution but a deferral.
The State complied at the sentencing hearing with its statutory duty to provide the
court with the names of the victim and the estimated restitution amount.11 The
presentence report stated, "No restitution appears to be owing at this time, however, if the
defendant does file an Income Tax Return for 1995, there may be an amount owed to the
State of Utah" (R. 750:2). A letterfromthe prosecuting attorney was attached to the
presentence report and stated that the Tax Commission had determined that defendant
owed $7,162.64 in taxes, interest, and penalties for the year 1995 (R. 750:13) (in Add. E).
The amount owed was again brought to the attention of both the court and defendant at

11

While information from the prosecution regarding restitution is normally framed
as a "request" for restitution, the Crime Victims Restitution Act imposes no duty upon the
prosecution to request restitution. The Act requires only that the prosecution provide the
court with the names of victims and the amounts of restitution sought by those victims.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-202 (Supp. 2001).
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the sentencing hearing by the prosecutor when he asserted that defendant owed $6,000 as
of August 1999 in tax, interest, and penalties for 1995 (R. 959:16).
It is understood that the final amount owing for defendant's crimes depends on the
information defendant was ordered to provide to the Tax Commission. The conditions of
his probation require him to "cooperate with the Tax Commission," "file returns for all
years requested," and "make any future filings" (R. 862). To set restitution before the
information was submitted would be premature. It follows logically that when the court
ordered defendant to file all his returns and cooperate with the Tax Commission, it also
intended that he pay the delinquent taxes for which he was convicted in the amount
ultimately determined by the Tax Commission based on all necessary information
defendant was ordered to provide. Consequently, a subsequent order imposing
restitution, once defendant made known his intent not to provide the necessary
information to the Tax Commission, was a step contemplated under the sentencing and
restitution statutes.
B.

Even assuming the State's motion is a Rule 59(e) motion to amend the
judgment the trial court maintained jurisdiction because the motion
was timely and thus tolled defendant's time to appeal.
Defendant characterizes the State's motion of September 21 as a motion to amend

the judgment filed under Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 59(e). Br. 2 of Aplt. at 8. He
claims that the motion was untimely, robbing the trial court of jurisdiction to act on it. Id.
at 16-18. This Court has held that the nomenclature used to designate a motion is

37

unimportant, and that it looks to the substance of the motion to determine how to treat it.
Kunzler v. O 'Dell, 855 P.2d 270, 273 (Utah App. 1993).
Assuming arguendo that the State's motion was a Rule 59(e) motion to amend the
judgment, defendant's claim that the motion was untimely is mistaken under the proper
calculation of the time under Rule 2, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.12 Rule 2, which
governs the computation of time in criminal cases, states, "When a period of time
prescribed or allowed is less than 11 days, intermediate Saturdays, Sundays, and legal
holidays shall not be included in the computation." Utah R. Crim. P. 2(a). The time to
file a motion to amend the judgment under Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 59(e) is ten
daysfromthe date of judgment. Accordingly, the computation of the ten day period is
ten "business days" and excludes weekends and holidays. Utah R. Crim. P. 2(a).
The judgment of the trial court was entered on Friday, September 7,2001 (R. 86163). The State filed its motion asking for clarification of the sentence on Friday,
September 21, 2001 (R. 881-83). The day judgment is entered is not included, but the last
day of the ten day period is. Utah R. Civ. P. 2(a). Thus, starting on Monday, September

l2

Rule 59(e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, applies to criminal cases pursuant to
Rule 81, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The latter rule provides:
These rules of procedure shall also govenr in any aspect of criminal
proceedings where there is no other applicable statute or rule, provided, that
any rule so applied does not conflict with any statutory or constitutional
requirement.
UtahR. Civ. P. 81(e).
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10 and counting forward ten days, excluding the two weekends, September 21 was the
tenth day of the period, and the State's motion was timely.
A timely motion under Rule 59 tolls the time for filing an appeal; a notice of
appeal filed before entry of an order on a timely Rule 59 motion is of no effect. Utah R.
App. P. 4(b). Therefore, even under defendant's characterization of the State's motion,
the motion was timely filed, the trial court had jurisdiction to consider and rule on it, and
defendant did not perfect his appeal until he filed his subsequent October 22 notice of
appeal.
POINT V
DEFENDANT EXPRESSLY WAIVED ANY RIGHT HE HAD TO A
RESTITUTION HEARING
Defendant claims that the trial court unlawfully imposed restitution without
affording him a hearing and without making a record of its consideration of the
defendant's financial resources, his ability to pay, and the rehabilitative effect of
restitution on defendant. Br. 2 of Aplt. at 19-29. This Court should reject defendant's
claim because it was not preserved for appeal, he expressly waived a hearing below, he
invited the error in the lower court, and he establishes no entitlemeat to relief on appeal.
A.

Background
The prosecutor filed his motion seeking a restitution order on September 21, 2001

(R. 881-87) (in Add. F). The court entered its order establishing a restitution amount on
September 26 (R. 896-979) (in Add. F). The order provided:
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The defendant is hereby Ordered as follows in addition to anything
already ordered in this case:
(1) File all past Utah State returns from 1990 to present;
(2) That the filings must account for income and expenses of
the defendant;
(3) That the defendant must present supporting documentation
with such returns;
4) That Restitution is hereby set at $6,105.94, for purposes of
this criminal case only, but that this amount does not bind the
Utah State Tax Commission, and further only related to tax
year 1995.
(Id). Add. F.
Defendant thereafter filed a written objection, essentially arguing:
1. The court had no jurisdiction to order defendant to file tax returns for years
other than 1995;
2. The court had no jurisdiction to enforce defendant's conviction because he
never received a pre-trial notice of a tax due.
3. The court could not order defendant to file a 1995 tax return because it would
effectively prevent defendant from challenging the deficiency noted in the Notice
of Deficiency sent him by the state tax commission; and
4. The court must summarily deny the proposed restitution order because the court
lacked jurisdiction to set an amount, grant the order or enforce the conviction,
"and no hearing is needed."
(R. 898-908) (in Add. F) (emphasis added).
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B.

Appellate review is not warranted because defendant did not preserve
his claim below.
"As a general rule, claims not raised before the trial court may not be raised on

appeal." State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74,111, 10 P.3d 346; see also State v. Cram, 2002
UT 37, f 14, 46 P.3d 230. "This rule applies to every claim, including constitutional
questions . . . . " Holgate, 2000 UT 74, at f 11. It applies in the sentencing phase of
criminal proceedings as well. See State v. Powell, 872 P.2d 1027, 1033 (Utah 1994)
(appellate court refused to reach challenge to trial court's failure to sentence defendant to
a lesser penalty because defendant failed to object to the sentence when it was imposed).
To properly preserve a claim, a party must present the objection to the trial court, state the
grounds for the objection specifically and distinctly, and ensure that the objection and its
supporting arguments become part of the trial record. See State v. Johnson, 11A P.2d
1141,1144 (Utah 1989); State v. Brown, 856 P.2d 358, 361 (Utah App. 1993).
Defendant objected below to the final order of the district court, but he did not
object to the entry of restitution. Instead, he objected only to the court's order that he file
a tax return, arguing that the court lacked jurisdiction to require him to file and that the
order would, in effect, prevent himfromchallenging the deficiency Jie Tax Commission
would ultimately identify. Defendant did not inform the judge that he believed the
sentence to be improper in any other manner, under either the rules of criminal procedure
or the restitution statute. Defendant did no^mention the amount of restitution imposed or
any desire to have a hearing on the amount, and he did not suggest that he had any other
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evidence he wished to present that had any bearing on the imposition or amount of
restitution. Hence, his "objection" did not preserve for appeal the arguments he has
raised.
£*

The district court need not act absent a request from defendant and
his failure to request a hearing waived his entitlement to one.
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in not sua sponte ordering a full hearing

on the restitution issue. Restitution is governed by section 77-38a-301. See Utah Code
Ann. § 77-38a-301 (Supp. 2001) (in Add. F). Subsection (4) provides: "If the defendant
objects to the imposition, amount, or distribution of the restitution, the court shall at the
time of sentencing allow the defendant a full hearing on the issue."13 Id.
It is well-settled that a defendant must object to restitution before a trial court is
obligated to hold a hearing, and that the objection must relate to "the imposition, amount,
or distribution" of restitution. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201; see also State v. Breeze,
2001 UT App 200,16,29 P.3d 19; State v. Weeks, 2000 UT App 273, ^ 9-10, 12 P.3d
13

At the time of sentencing in this case, the restitution issue was not ripe for a
hearing inasmuch as the restitution amount was necessarily tied to the information to be
provided in the tax return that defendant was to file as part of his sentence (R. 862). The
presentence investigation report noted that any restitution would be determined only upon
the filing of the 1995 tax return (R. 750: 2), and defendant repeatedly assured the court at
sentencing that he would cooperate fully with the Tax Commission and AP&P's
probation requirements (R. 959:12,13,21). It was not until defendant refused to file the
return that the State sought to have a restitution amount set by the court. The prosecutor's
claim that defendant balked at the filing of the return finds support in defendant's
subsequent written objection to the restitution order, which argues at length that the trial
court lacked jurisdiction to order the filing of tax returns (R. 898-908). Accordingly, the
State's conduct in delaying its restitution request was reasonable under the facts of this
case and did not rob defendant of the opportunity to request a hearing on the issue.
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110, cert, granted, 21 P.3d 218 (Utah Feb. 27, 2001); State v. Haga, 954 P.2d 1284, 1289
(Utah App. 1998) (defendant is entitled to a restitution hearing where he requested it). In
this case, the substance of defendant's written objection clearly establishes that
defendant's objection was to the court's imposition of the requirement that he file a tax
return and the effect that order would have on his dealings with the Tax Commission.
Defendant did not object to the restitution amount or its basis. Accordingly, there was no
duty on the trial court to provide a restitution hearing. See Weeks, 2000 UT App 273, at f
10 (defendant's failure to request a restitution hearing below waived his entitlement to
such a hearing); see also Utah R. Crim. P. 12(d) ("Failure of the defendant to timely raise
defenses or objections or to make requests which must be made prior to trial or at the time
set by the court shall constitute waiver thereof... ").
Moreover, defendant's written "objection" included an express waiver of a
restitution hearing. Defendant expressly stated, "... no hearing is needed" (R. 902).
Add. F. His language was simple and direct, was not couched in conditional terms, and
did not request or imply a desire for a hearing in the event the court disagreed with
defendant's argument
Defendant attempts to rescind his waiver by claiming that "[s]ince the trial court
did not summarily deny the [State's] request, [defendant] was entitled to a hearing." Br. 2
of Aplt. at 22, n.4. The law is clear that defendant's entitlement to a restitution hearing is
dependent upon his timely request for one. See Monson v. Carver, 928 P.2d 1017, 1029
(Utah 1996) (holding no restitution hearing is mandated when defendant did not object to
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order of restitution or request a hearing); Weeks, 2000 UT App 273, at f 10. Nothing in
defendant's written objection alerted the district court to this alternative interpretation of
defendant's express waiver of a hearing. Moreover, the basis of defendant's
objection—the alleged lack of jurisdiction to order the filing of a tax return—did nothing
to alert the trial court to the possibility that defendant might want a hearing on the issue of
the restitution amount.
The fact that the trial court rendered the restitution order within five days of the
State's request without waiting for defendant's response does not require reversal. It did
not obviate defendant's duty to raise his desire for a hearing below or prevent defendant
from making the request. See Weeks, 2000 UT App 273, at f 10 (noting that defendant
had ample opportunity to object to the restitution or request a hearing "before, during, or
after the court imposed [the restitution] amount" at sentencing). Defendant in fact filed a
written "objection" after the trial court's ruling. He could have, at that time, objected to
the restitution itself or made a request for a hearing. He did neither. Instead, he expressly
stated he did not need a hearing. Had defendant's objection included a hearing request,
the trial court could have held one and amended the restitution order, if appropriate. Cf.
State v. Allen, 2000 UT App 340, f 11, 15 P.3d 110 (holding that court retains jurisdiction
to enforce restitution even after probation expired).
In any event, defendant's written waiver of a hearing prevents himfromprevailing
on his claim because he essentially "invited" the trial court to forego any hearing. Having
expressly waived a hearing and having made no mention to the district court of the
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existence of any additional information relevant to the restitution determination,
defendant cannot now fault the lower court for failing to intuit that a hearing was
necessary or desired. He should not now be permitted to benefit from his actions below.
See Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 620 (Utah 1994) (recognizing the invited error
doctrine), cert denied, 513 U.S. 966 (1994); State v. Perdue, 813 P.2d 1201, 1205 (Utah
App. 1991) (recognizing that invited error precludes appellate review).
D.

Defendant's failure to establish that his sentence was imposed in an
illegal manner defeats his request under rule 22(e)
Defendant also seeks a remand for a restitution hearing under Rule 22(e), Utah

Rules of Criminal Procedure, arguing that absent the hearing he failed to request, the
sentence was imposed in an illegal manner, and that he should be permitted to return to
the district court to contest the restitution issue. Br. 2 of Aplt. at 9-19,22,28-29 n.7.
Rule 22(e) provides that "[t]he court may correct an illegal sentence, or a sentence
imposed in an illegal manner, at any time." Utah R. Crim. P. 22(e). This rule permits an
appellate court to consider the legality of a sentence even if the issue is raised for the first
time on appeal. See State v. Brooks, 908 P.2d 856, 859 (Utah 1995). However, to obtain
relief on appeal, the defendant must establish that his sentence was imposed in an illegal
manner.
He has not done so. He has not shown any duty on the district court to set a
restitution hearing absent his request, shown that he made a request or that it was denied,
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or, m any other way, shown that his sentence was "imposed in an illegal manner" so as to
invoke rule 22(e).
£.

Defendant waived his claim of error involving the absence of findings
and a statement of the appropriateness of a restitution award, and
establishes no plain error on appeal.
Defendant also argues that he is entitled to a remand for a restitution hearing

because the trial court did not consider relevant statutory factors, as evidenced by the lack
of any findings regarding restitution. Br. 2 of Aplt. at 26-29.
The relevant statute provides guidance as to the factors to be considered by the
trial court in determining restitution.14 However, as stated, defendant never challenged

,4

Section 76-3-20 l(4)(d)(i) (1999), provides:

If the court determines that restitution is appropriate or inappropriate
under this subsection, the court shall make the reasons for the decision a
part of the court record.
Add. E. Among other potential factors to be considered, subsection (8)(c)(i), provides:
(c) In determining the monetary sum and other conditions for courtordered restitution, the court shall consider the factors listed in Subsection
(8)(b) and:
(i) thefinancialresources of the defendant and the
burden that payment of restitution will impose, with regard to
the other obligations of the defendant;
(ii) the ability of the defendant to pay restitution on an
installment basis or on other conditions to be fixed by the
court;
(iii) the rehabilitative effect on the defendant of the
payment of restitution and th^method of payment; and
(iv) other circumstances which the court determines
make restitution inappropriate.
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the restitution award itself or the basis of the award, only the trial court's jurisdiction to
order the filing of a tax return. "'If the trial court, as defendant alleges, erroneously failed
to consider defendant's paltry financial resources before ordering [restitution], defendant
should have immediately brought that error to the attention of the sentencing judge. If
defendant was denied relief at that time, he could have taken [a] direct appeal."' Weeks,
2000 UT App 273, at ^ 14 (quoting James v. Galetka, 965 P.2d 567, 574 (Utah App.
1998) (emphasis added), cert denied sub nom., James v. Warden, 982 P.2d 88 (Utah
1999)). Because defendant failed to challenge below the factors to be considered by the
trial court or the court's reasons for deeming a restitution aware appropriate, his claim
fails on appeal. Id.
Defendant also argues plain error in the trial court's alleged failure to consider the
statutory factors and enter appropriate findings before ordering restitution. Br. 2 of Aplt.
at 28-29, n.7. To establish plain error, defendant must show: 1) that an error existed 2)
that should have been obvious to the trial court and 3) that was harmful, i.e., absent the
error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for the appellant. See
State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201,1208-09 (Utah 1993). Defendant fails to meet his burden
on appeal.
Section 76-3-20 l(8)(b) does not require that the trial court put findings on the
record concerning each of the named factors. See Weeks, 2000 UT App 273, at f 16.

Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-20 l(8)(c)(i) (1999). Add. E.
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Instead, the statute simply "lists the factors which must be considered, and contains no
such [recording] requirement." Id. Hence, there is no plain error in the court's failure to
outline on the record findings underlying its restitution decision.
Once the court determines whether restitution is or is not appropriate, section 76-3201(4)(d)(i) requires that it "make the reasons for the decision a part of the court record."
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-20 l(4)(d)(i). Add. E. In this case, it is clearfromthe filings
relating to restitution and the fact that the case involves a tax debt from 1995 that the
restitution was appropriate as a realistic estimate of the amount owing by defendant. It is
also clear that identification of a restitution figure became necessary due to defendant's
refusal to file his tax return, notwithstanding having promised the court he would
cooperate with the Tax Commission and file the returns they required of him (R. 959:12,
13,21). Accordingly, any error in the district court's failure to explain the
appropriateness of the restitution order would not be plain as the explanation is obvious
given the circumstances of this case.
Moreover, the court's failure to expressly explain the appropriateness of the
restitution order is not harmful in this case. The court expressly provided that the
restitution figure, which was in line with other estimates in the record of the amount
owing for the 1995 tax year, would "not bind the Utah State Tax Commission," thereby
allowing for adjustments to be made to the actual amount eventually found by the Tax
Commission (R. 907; R. 750:13; R. 959:16). Further, there is no reason to believe that
the inclusion of a statement explaining why restitution was being ordered would have any
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beanng on the restitution amount in a case in which the debt is one capable of being
determined with certainty by the Tax Commission upon discovery of all the relevant
information. The district court was obviously mindful of this fact in providing the Tax
Commission leeway to varyfromthis figure. Accordingly, any error in the court's failure
to comply with subsection (4)(d)(i) involving the appropriateness of imposing restitution
would not be harmful in this case. Hence, defendant's plain error claim fails.15
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests that this Court affirm
defendant's convictions and sentences.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /

day of October, 2002.
MARKSHURTLEFF
Attorney General

[S C. LEONARD
Assistant Attorney General
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In the event this Court determines that some statement of appropriateness is
required, it should nevertheless reject defendant's request for a full restitution hearing
upon remand. Instead, the appropriate remedy is "to order the trial court to comply with
the statute by giving 'an explanation of its decision which demonstrates that it has taken
into account the appropriate statutory factors.'" Weeks, 2000 UT App 273, at ^f 17, n.8
(quoting Monson, 928 P.2d at 1028).
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I hereby certify that two true and accurate copies of the foregoing Brief of
Appellee were mailed by first class mail, postage prepaid, to Linda M. Jones and Ronald
S. Fujino, Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc, 424 East 500 South, Suite 300, Salt Lake
City, UT 84111, this /

day of October, 2002.
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Addenda

Addendum A

UTAH CODE

PART 11
TAXATION

ANNOTATED

76-8-1101. Operating without tax license — Tax evasion —
Statute of limitations*

1953

VOLUME 8B
1995 REPLACEMENT

Titles 76 and 77

(1) As provided in Section 59-1-401:
(a) Any person who is required by Title 59 or any laws the State Tax
Commission administers or regulates to register with or obtain a license or
permit from the State Tax Commission, or who operates without having
registered or secured a license or permit, or who operates when the
registration, license, or permit is expired or not current, is guilty of a class
B misdemeanor, except that, notwithstanding Section 76-3-301, the fine is
not less than $500 nor more than $1,000.
(b) Any person who, with intent to evade any tax or requirement of Title
59 or any lawful requirement of the State Tax Commission, fails to make,
render, sign, or verify any return or to supply any information within the
time required under this title, or who makes, renders, signs, or verifies any
false or fraudulent return or statement, or who supplies any false or
fraudulent information, is guilty of a third degree felony, except that,
notwithstanding Section 76-3-301, the fine is not less than $1,000 nor
more than $5,000.
(c) Any person who willfully attempts to evade or defeat any tax or the
payment thereof is, in addition to other penalties provided by law, guilty
of a second degree felony, except that, notwithstanding Section 76-3-301,
the fine is not less than $1,500 nor more than $25,000.
(2) Th e *t*tute of limitations for prosecution for a violation of this section is
i£ years from the date the tax should have been remitted.
History: C. IMS, 76-8-1101, enacted by L.
1007. •*• a» * 6 7 '

76-1-402. Separate offenses arising out of single criminal
episode — Included offenses.

UTAH CODE
ANNOTATED
1953

VOLUME 8B
1999 REPLACEMENT

Titles 76 and 77

(1) A defendant may be prosecuted in a single criminal action for all
separate offenses arising out of a single criminal episode; however, when the
same act of a defendant under a single criminal episode shall establish offenses
which may be punished in different ways under different provisions of this
code, the act shall be punishable under only one such provision; an acquittal or
conviction and sentence under any such provision bars a prosecution under
any other such provision.
(2) Whenever conduct may establish separate offenses under a single
criminal episode, unless the court otherwise orders to promote justice, a
defendant shall not be subject to separate trials for multiple offenses when:
(a) The offenses are within the jurisdiction of a single court; and
(b) The offenses are known to the prosecuting attorney at the time the
defendant is arraigned on the first information or indictment.
(3) A defendant may be convicted of an offense included in the offense
charged but may not be convicted of both the offense charged and the included
offense. An offense is so included when:
(a) It is established by proof of the same or less than all the facts
required to establish the commission of the offense charged; or
(b) It constitutes an attempt, solicitation, conspiracy, or form of preparation to commit the offense charged or an offense otherwise included
therein; or
(c) It is specifically designated by a statute as a lesser included offense.
(4) The court shall not be obligated to charge the jury with respect to an
included offense unless there is a rational basis for a verdict acquitting the
defendant of the offense charged and convicting him of the included offense.
(5) If the district court on motion after verdict or judgment, or an appellate
court on appeal or certiorari, shall determine that there is insufficient evidence
to support a conviction for the offense charged but that there is sufficient
evidence to support a conviction for an included offense and the trier of fact
necessarily found every fact required for conviction of that included offense,
the verdict or judgment of conviction may be set aside or reversed and a
judgment of conviction entered fo&the included offense, without necessity of a
new trial, if such relief is sought By the defendant.
Hirtory: C. 1M3, 76-1-402, enacted by L.
1973, oh. I S * ft 76-1-408; 1974, ch. 32, ft 2.

9

f^utt

Attempt to evaae or aereat tax

Any person who willfully attempts in any manner to evade or
defeat any tax imposed by this title or the payment thereof shall, in
addition to other penalties provided by law, be guilty of a felony
and, upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not more than $100,000
($500,000 in the case of a corporation), or imprisoned not more
than 5 years, or both, together with the costs of prosecution.
(Aug. 16, 1954, c. 736, 68A Stat. 851; Sept. 3, 1982, Pub.L. 97-248, Title III,
§ 329(a), 96 Stat. 618.)

HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES
Revision Notes and Legislative Reports
1954 Act- House Report No. 1337.
Senate Report No. 1622. and Conference
Report No. 2543. see 1954 U.S.Code
Cong, and Adm.News, pp. 4572, 5251,
5343, respectively.
*. ^ *~
1982 Act. Senate Report No. 97-494.
House Conference Report No. 97-760.
and Statements by Legislative Leaders,
see 1982 U.S.Code Cong, and AdmNews,
p. 781.

Amendments
19*1 Amendment Pub.L. 97-248 subdiluted "$ 100,000 «5(».000 in the case
of a corporation) for $10.00T.
Effective Dates
1982 Act. Section 329(e) of Pub.L
97-248 provided that: T h e amendments
madc
o y this section [amending this section and sections 7203. 7206, and 7207 of
this title] shall apply to offenses committed after the date of the enactment of
this Act [Sept. 3. 1982]."

UNITED
STATES
CODE
ANNOTATED
TITLE 26

m

.-VW.

»»•••*«! IOIIUIC w inc rvwrn, suppiy iniormauon, or pay tax

Any person required under this title to pay any estimated tax or tax, or required l>\
this title or by regulations made under authority thereof to make a return, keep an;
records, or supply any information, who willfully fails to pay such estimated tax or tax
make sucji return, keep such records, or supply such information, at the time or times
required by law or regulations, shall, in addition to other penalties provided by law, tx
guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not more than
$25,000 ($100,000 in the case of a corporation), or imprisoned not more than 1 year, oi
both, together with the costs of prosecution. In the case of any person with respect u
whom there is a failure to pay any estimated tax, this section shall not apply to such
person with respect to such failure if there is no addition to tax under section 6664 ot
6665 with respect to such failure. In the case of a willful violation of any provision ol
section 60501, the first sentence of this section shall be applied by substituting "felony'
for "misdemeanor" and "5 years" for "1 year".
(Aug. 16,1954, c. 736, 68A Stat 851; June 28,1968, Pub.L. 90-364, Title I, § 10S(eX6), 82 Stat 264,
Sept 3,1982, Pub.L. 97-248, Title i n , ft$ 327,329(b), 96 Stat 617, 618; July 18,1984, Pub.L. 98-369,
Div. A, Title IV, $ 412(bX9), 98 Stat 792; Nov. 18, 1988, Pub.L. 100-690, Tide VII, § 7601(aX2XB),
102 Stat 4604; Nov. 29,1990, Pub.L. 101-647, Title XXXIII, * 3808(a), 104 Stat. 4918.)
HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES
Sevtaion Notes and Legislative Reports
Effective Dates
•

r

provided that: The amendment made by subsection (a) [amending this section] shall apply to
1910 Amendment Pub.L. 101-647 aubetftut- actions, and failure* to act, occurring after the
ad in laet 1aentence "anbelftuting felony*fortraie- date of the enactment of thia Act [Nov. 29,
demeanor and *6 yeara* for '1 year* *for"aubeti- 1990).*
felting '6 yean'for'1 year*".

UNITED STATES CODE
ANNOTATED
Title 2 6
Internal Revenue Code
§§ 7201 to 7440

Internal Revenue Code
§§ 7201 to 7440

2001
Cumulative Annual Pocket Part

Addendum B

Thomas H. Smith
1301 WHBR
Vernal, UT 84078
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

CASE NO. 99192022$
Plaintiff,

BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF ORAL
MOTION TO DISMISS
MULTIPLICIOUS CHARGE IN
AMENDED (2nd) INFORMATION

VS.

THOMAS H. SMITH,
Judge: Ann M. Stirfoa
Defendant.
I. FACTS
1. On October 12,1999, the Plaintiff filed an original Information containing two (2)
counts.
2. On the April 4, 2001, the Plaintiff filed an amended Information containing two
(2) criminal counts, citing violations of Utah Code Annotated (1953 Amended) §
76-8-1101 and 76-8-1101(l)(c).
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3. On the date of trial, April 9, 2001, the Plaintiff amended a second time the
Information reflecting two (2) criminal counts, citing violation of Utah Code
Annotated (1953 Amended) § 76-8-1101(l)(b) and § 76-8-1101(l)(c).
4. On the date of trial, April 9, 2001, the Defendant objected to the interlineation
and the creation of the superseding Information.
5. In camera, on the day of trial, the Trial Court ordered the defense to brief the
Court.

H. HISTORY
In case instant, Defendant orally argued the charging instrument, an
Information, that Count 2 was a reiteration of Count 1 in different verbiage. Citing
US v. Hord. 6 F.3d 276 (5th Cir, (1993)) as a basis, the instrument is defective because
a single offense had been alleged in a number of counts, unfairly increasing the
defendant's exposure to criminal sanctions.

ffl. ARGUMENT
In Hord. the appeal concerned multiplicious convictions for bank fraud, and
turned on the question of when a "scheme" is "executed" for purposes of the bank
Page 2

fraud statute. Douglas James Hord was convicted on 19 counts: nine for executing
and attempting to execute a scheme to defraud a federally insured bank; and ten for
making false statements to the bank. He was sentenced to 19 concurrent six-month
terms of imprisonment. The 5th Circuit Court of Appeals, upon appeal, affirmed in
part and reversed and vacated in part.
Hord contended that all nine counts [over a period of time] related to the same
offense — a single scheme to defraud a single financial institution. Before trial, he
moved to consolidate all nine counts on the ground that they were multiplicious.
The District court denied the motion. However upon appeal, the 5th Circuit Court
of Appeals found that counts one and seven through nine were multiplicious,
reversed those convictions and vacated the sentences imposed pursuant to them.

Similar in that it deals with fraud, Lemons (941 F.2d 309, (5th Cir. (1991))),
involved a scheme to procure monetary benefit from a single financial institution.
The scheme for the receiving of the said benefits, occurred in a series of transactions,
over the course of several months. The Court found a two-loan scheme may subject
an institution to greater risk than a scheme involving only one transaction, it is the
execution of the scheme itself that subjects a defendant to criminal liability, not the
execution of each step or transaction in furtherance of the scheme. Because the
Lemon' indictments sought to punish for execution of the multiple steps involved
Page 3

in the scheme, the counts were multiplicitous therefore, the Appeals Court
remanded the case.
The Appeals Court, in Hord. quotes the findings in Lemons, that "the bank fraud
statute imposes punishment [...] for each execution of the "scheme" to defraud,
rather than for each act in execution of the scheme. The Court in Lemons, held the
incremental movement of the benefit to the defendant was "only part of but one
performance, one completion, one execution of that scheme." In US v. Heath, (970
F.2d 1397, 1402 (5th Cir. (1992)), the Court found a critical factor to hold whether
there a was single execution of a scheme to defraud, although involving procuring
two separate loans from a single financial, was whether the two loans were
integrally related; where neither scheme to defraud could have succeeded without
the other.

In the case instant, the Plaintiff charges the defendant with intent to evade by
failing to make, render, sign, or verify a tax return (§ 76-8-1101(l)(b)) and willfully
tax evasion (§ 76-8-1101(l)(c)) for the year 1995 .
In parallel argument in accordance with Lemons, Hord and Heath,
substantively, the Plaintiff has failed to show that § 76-8-1101(1)0)), evading any tax
by failure to make, render, sign, or verify any return; and § 76-8-llOKlMc), a willful
attempt to evade or defeat any taxes are not integrally related, and are any thing
Page 4

more than "executions" or "performances" of a single scheme.

In fact, the

performance of such evasion scheme as in § 76-8-1101(l)(c) is doomed to failure
without the positive actions enumerated in § 76-8-1101(l)(b).
In the analysis of Plaintiffs allegations, in light of Hord, Lemons, and Heath, it is
obvious the allegations are based upon a single scheme from an alleged single
episode, even though the Plaintiff contends that "evasion" by failing to make,
render, sign, or verify a tax return and attempting to "evade" tax are separate
independent violations.

The Plaintiff's reasoning is flawed in, that similar

behavior, engaged in on separate occasions, may sometimes constitute several
separate violations. Plaintiff makes no such claim of separate occasions. The fact
that the allegations are based upon a single episode/scheme is undisputed by either
party. It then is obvious, the Plaintiff is attempting to separate an alleged single
scheme into separate executions merely to increase the probability of gaining a
conviction, by exposing the Defendant to a greater selection of criminal sanctions
available to the trier-of-fact — the very objective the Courts intended to prevent in

in grabowski Y. Jackson County Public Defenders, (47 F.3d 1386 (5th Or. (1995)),
Grabowski appealed the denial of his petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus,
challenging the legality of his conviction, and the denial of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983
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prisoner complaint.

The Appeals Court affirmed in part and remanded with

instructions in part.

The Appeals Court in its' analysis of the claim of double

jeopardy, concluded there was no violation in Grabowski's convictions because the
evidence and elements of the crime of burglary/larceny were not [according to
Mississippi statutory law] the same as the crime of robbery. Continuing, the Court
cited the finding in Blockburger v. US. (284 U.S. 299,52 S.Ct. 180,76 L. Ed. 306 (1932)),
and indicated the test for double jeopardy is whether each offense requires proof of
an additional fact which the other does not.
Not so in § 76-8-1101(l)(c) and § 76-8-1101(l)(b). Neither "intent7' or "willful" are
crimes, but in both § 76-8-1101(l)(c) and § 76-8-1101(l)(b) the criminal act is evasion.
Section 76-8-1101(l)(b) enumerates the actions required to prescribe "intent." A
"willful" act described in § 76-8-1101(l)(c) requires the same overt actions as
delineated in § 76-8-1101(l)(b). Plainly there is no significant or practical difference
in the usage of the words "intent" or "willful" as adjectives used below.
Intent:* 1. Firmly fixed; concentrated.
2. Having the attention applied;
3. Having the mind and will focused on a specific purpose.
Willful:* 1. Said or done on purpose; deliberate.
2. Obstinately bent on having one's own way.
1

American Heritage Dictionary

2

Ibid.
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§76-8-1101(1):
(b) Any person who, with intent to evade any tax [...], fails to make,
render, sign, or verify any return or to supply any information within
the time required under this title, or who makes, renders, signs, or
verifies any false or fraudulent return or statement, or who supplies
any false or fraudulent information, is guilty of a third degree felony,
[...]. (Emphasis added)
(c) Any person who willfully attempts to evade or defeat any tax or the
payment thereof is, in addition to other penalties provided by law,
guilty of a second degree felony[...]. (Emphasis added)

IV. CONCLUSION
In the case instant, Count I and Count II are identical charges phrased differently.
Both counts stem from the same alleged episode or scheme. Both require the same
elements to be proven, § 76-8-1101(l)(c) being subsumed by the explicit listing in §
76-8-1101(l)(b).
Given the arguments above and the analysis of the various District and Appeals
Courts, Count I and Count II, as they stand, prejudices the cause of the Defendant
and places the Defendant in an untenable position, on the slippery slope, of having
to defend against multiple charges, unfairly increasing the Defendant's exposure to
criminal sanctions.
Consequentially, the Court instant should find Count II a multiplicious
redactment of Count I and therefore Count II should be dismissed.
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Dated: 11 t h day of April, 2001
Respectfully submitted,

^TfiOMAS H. SMTH

CERTIRCATE OF SERVICE
Thomas H. Smith, certifies that Thomas H. Smith mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing document, by hand delivery, on this 11th day of April, 2001, for the following:
MARK W.BAER #5440
Assistant Attorney General
160 East 300 South 6th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Ron Fujno
Standby Counsel
Salt Lake Legal Defenders
424 East 500 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
DATED: this 11th day of April, 2001
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE CITY
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vs.

JURY TRIAL

(Videotape Proceedings)

THOMAS HOWARD SMITH,

(Volume Three)

Defendant.
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Case No. 991920225

BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 11th day of April,
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2001, commencing at the hour of 9:40 a.m., the above-
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entitled matter came on for further hearing before the
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HONORABLE RAYMOND S. UNO, sitting as Judge in the above-
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named Court for the purpose of this cause, and that the
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following further videotape proceedings were had.
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For the State:

MARK W. BAER
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Assistant Attorney Generals
160 East 300 south
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Attorney at Law
Salt Lake Legal Defender
Association
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Salt Lake City, Utah
84111
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the counts would be multiplicious and they're put there—in
there only for the chance, for the reason of allowing the
State to increase their chance of—from one out of one to
three out of four of getting a conviction.
And that puts the defendant in an untenable
position, puts the defendant in a—a position of not having
a level playing field in this issue, of—of having a reduced
chance of being found not guilty.

And that then becomes

multiplicious under the definitions.
Now, the reason that Fifth Circuit cases are used
is because that's the only circuit that's ruled on this
issue.

There are no other cases available on multi—

multipliciousness out of any other circuits, including the
Tenth Circuit; so therefore, we relied on information from
the First Circuit—Fifth Circuit because they're the ones
who ruled on it.

And I believe it would be applicable in

this circuit since it's the only cases available.
THE COURT:

Based on the argument that's been

made, the Court is of the opinion that the motion should be
denied.

I think the arguments made by counsel are

persuasive and that there are two separate counts in this
here and that there are ot^er statutes that I'm quite aware
of, criminal statutes essentially have the same type of
wording and—and separate counts.
The case of the Fifth—is it the Eighth—Eighth
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Circuit, isn't it?

Down in—

MR. SMITH: Vernal.
THE COURT:

—Vernal.

And Mr.—Judge Payne, I

think are different cases, different fact situations,
different law so it's not binding on this Court here.
And as far as the Fifth Circuit, it's a different
jurisdiction.

I don't know whether we've had any here and

the State has not had a chance to research that because it
was just given this recently; but the Court is of the
opinion, just based on the arguments that's been made, that
the Court—the State's arguments are persuasive at this time
and the Court's going to deny the motion to dismiss or to
drop on count in this case.
(Off the record.)
MR. BAER:

Judge, I think the Court's ruled, I was

wondering if we could proceed.
THE COURT:

Yeah.

MR. SMITH:

I guess I'm back up here, aren't I?

MR. BAER:

Okay.

I think he was still on the stand;

right?
THE COURT:

Okay.

Get the jury in.

I just want to apologize again, we've been going
over these jury instructions and having some problems in
determining—determining which ones we should give and which
ones we shouldn't.

I think we've finally come to a
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Addendum C

Pase 1
1 i 1 S Ct 604
112 L Ed 2d 617, 59 USLW 4049, 67 A F T R 2d 91-344, 91-1 USTC P 50,012
(Cite as: 498 U.S. 192, 111 S.Ct. 604)
Supreme Court of the United States
John L CHEEK, Petitioner,
v
UNITED STATES.

on the defendant, that the defendant knew of the duty,
and that he voluntarily and intentionally violated that
duty 26 U S C A H 7201. 7203
131 Criminal Law €=>20
110k20 Most Cited Cases

No. 89-658.
Argued Oct. 3, 1990.
Decided Jan. 8, 1991

Defendant was convicted in the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Paul E.
Plunkett, J , of attempting to evade income taxes and
failing to file income tax returns, and he appealed. The
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed, 882
F.2d 1263. The Umted States Supreme Court, Justice
White, held that: (1) defendant was not entitled to
acquittal based on good-faith belief that income tax law
was unconstitutional as applied to him and thus did not
legally impose any duty on him, but (2) defendant's
good-faith belief that the tax laws did not impose any
duty on him did not have to be objectively reasonable
in order to be considered by the jury.

Where issue is whether defendant knew of duty
purportedly imposed by statute or regulation he is
accused of violating, if Government proves actual
knowledge of the pertinent legal duty, the prosecution,
without more, has satisfied the knowledge component
of the willfulness requirement.
141 Internal Revenue €=^5300
220k5300 Most Cited Cases
Government has not proved that defendant was aware
of the duty imposed by the tax law which he is accused
of willfully disobeying if the jury credits a good- faith
misunderstanding and belief submission, whether or not
the claimed belief or misunderstanding is objectively
reasonable. 26U.S.C.A. fr§ 7201. 7203
I S Internal Revenue €=>526335
220kS263.35 Most Cited Cases

Vacated and remanded.
Justice Scaha, filed an opinion concurring in the
judgment.
Justice Blackmun filed a dissenting opinion in which
Justice Marshall joined.
Justice Souter did not participate.
Opinion on remand, 931 F 2d 1206.

Defendant's claimed good-faith belief need not be
objectively reasonable in order for it to negate
Government's evidence purporting to show defendant's
awareness of his duties under the tax laws. 26
U.S.CA. S$ 7201. 7203.
Ifl Constitutional Law €=>38
92k38 Most Cited Cases
Where possible, court interprets congressional
enactments so as to avoid raising serious constitutional
questions.

West Headnotes
£ 0 Internal Revenue €=>5317
220k5317 Most Cited Cases

HI Criminal Law €=>313
110k313 Most Cited Cases

121 Internal Revenue €=>526335
220k5263 35 Most Cited Cases

It was error to instruct the jury to disregard evidence of
defendant's understanding that, within meaning of the
tax laws, he was not person required to file a return or
to pay income taxes and that wages are not taxable
income, as incredible as those misunderstandings of and
beliefs about the tax law might be 26 U S C A fr§
7201. 7203

"Willfulness" for purposes of criminal tax laws requires
the Government to prove that the law imposed a duty

181 Internal Revenue €=>5263 J 5
220k5263.35 Most Cited Cases

Based on the notion that the law is definite and
knowable, common law presumed that every persoft
knew the law
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Defendant's good-faith belief that income tax law was
unconstitutional as applied to him did not provide
defense to charges of willfully attempting to evade
income taxes and failing to file income tax returns,
notwithstanding claim that, because of his belief in the
unconstitutionality of the tax laws as applied to him, the
income tax laws could not legally impose any duty
upon him of which he should have been aware. 26
U.S.C.A. SS 7201. 7203.
**605 Syllabus iFN*l

FN* The syllabus constitutes no part of the
opinion of the Court but has been prepared by
the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience
of the reader. See United Stares v. Detroit
Lumber Co.. 200 U.S. 321, 337.26 S.Ct. 282.
287, 50 L.Ed. 499.
Petitioner Cheek was charged with six counts of
willfully failing to file a federal income tax return in
violation of § 7203 of the Internal Revenue Code
(Code) and three counts of willfully attempting to evade
his income taxes in violation of $ 7201. Although
admitting that he had not filed his returns, he testified
that he had not acted willfully because he sincerely
believed, based on his indoctrination by a group
believing that the federal tax system is unconstitutional
and his own study, that the tax laws were being
unconstitutionally enforced and that his actions were
lawful. In instructing the jury, the court stated that an
honest but unreasonable belief is not a defense and does
not negate willfulness, and that Cheek's beliefs that
wages are not income and that he was not a taxpayer
within the meaning of the Code were not objectively
reasonable. It also instructed the jury that a person's
opinion that the tax laws violate his constitutional rights
does not constitute a good-faith misunderstanding of
the law. Cheek was convicted, and the Court of
Appeals affirmed.
Held:
1. A good-faith misunderstanding of the law or a
good-faith belief that one is not violating the law
negates willfulness, whether or not the claimed beliefor
misunderstanding is objectively reasonable. Statutory
willfulness, which protects the average citizen from
prosecution for innocent mistakes made due to the
complexity of the tax laws, United States v. Murdoch
290 U.S. 389. 54 S.Ct 223. 78 L.Ed. 381. is the
voluntary, intentional violation of a known legal duty.
United States v. Pomponio. 429 U.S. 10.97 S.Ct. 22.50
L.Ed.2d 12.
Thus, if the jury credited Cheek's
assertion that he truly believed that the Code did not
treat wages as income, the Government would not have
carried its burden to prove willfulness, however

unreasonable a court might deem such a belief.
Characterizing a belief as objectively
unreasonable**606 transforms what is normally a
factual inquiry into a legal one, thus preventing a jury
from considering it. And forbidding a jury to consider
evidence that might negate willfulness would raise a
serious question under the Sixth Amendment's jury trial
provision, which this interpretation of die statute
avoids. Of course, in deciding whether to credit
Cheek's claim, the jury is free to consider any
admissible evidence showing that he had knowledge of
his legal duties. Pp. 609-612.
*193 2. It was proper for the trial court to instruct the
jury not to consider Cheek's claim that the tax laws are
unconstitutional, since a defendant's views about the tax
statutes' validity are irrelevant to the issue of
willfulness and should not be heard by a jury. Unlike
the claims in the Murdock-Pomponio line of cases,
claims that Code provisions are unconstitutional do not
arise from innocent mistakes caused by the Code's
complexity. Rather, they reveal full knowledge of the
provisions at issue and a studied conclusion that those
provisions are invalid and unenforceable. Congress
could not have contemplated that a taxpayer, without
risking criminal prosecution, could ignore his duties
under the Code and refuse to utilize the mechanisms
Congress provided to present his invalidity claims to
the courts and to abide by their decisions. Cheek was
free to pay the tax, file for a refund, and, if denied,
present his claims to the courts. Also, without paying
the tax, he could have challenged claims of tax
deficiencies in the Tax Court. Pp. 612-613.
882F.2d 1263. (CA7 1989) vacated and remanded.
WHITE, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in
which REHNQUIST, C.J., and STEVENS,
O'CONNOR, and KENNEDY, JJ., joined. SCALIA,
J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, post, p.
613. BLACKMUN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in
which MARSHALL, J., joined, post, p. 614.
SOUTER, J., took no part in the consideration or
decision of the case.
William R. Coulson argued the cause for petitioner.
With him on the briefs was Susan M. Keegan.
Edwin S. Kneedler argued the cause for the United
States. With him on the brief were Solicitor General
Starr, Assistant Attorney General Peterson, Deputy
Solicitor General Bryson, Robert E. Lindsay, and Alan
Hechtkopf.

Justice WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.
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title 26 ^ ~2Ul of thi Lmtcd States Code provides
that any person "who willfully attempts in any manner
to evade or defeat any tax imposed by this title or the
payment thereof shall be guilty of a felony Under 26
U S.C. S 7203, n[a]ny person required under this title
or by regulations made under authority thereof to make
a return who willfully fails to make such return"
shall be guilty of a misdemeanor *194 This case turns
on the meaning of the word "willfully" as used in ££
7201 and 7203
I
Petitioner John L. Cheek has been a pilot for American
Airlines since 1973 He filed federal income tax returns
through 1979 but thereafter ceased to file returns IFN11
He also claimed an increasing number of withholding
allowances-eventually claiming 60 allowances by
mid-1980-and for the years 1981 to 1984 indicated on
his W-4 forms that he was exempt from federal income
taxes
In 1983, petitioner unsuccessfully sought a
refund of all tax withheld by his employer in 1982
Petitioner's income during this period at all times far
exceeded the minimum necessary to digger the
statutory filing requirement.

FN1. Cheek did file what the Court of
Appeals described as a frivolous return in
1982

As a result of his activities, petitioner was indicted for
10 violations of federal law. He was charged with six
counts of willfully failing to file a federal income tax
return for the years 1980,1981, and 1983 through 1986,
m violation of § 7203. He was further charged with
three counts of willfully attempting to **607 evade his
income taxes for the years 1980, 1981, and 1983 in
violation of 26 U S C § 7201.
In those years,
American Airlines withheld substantially less than the
amount of tax petitioner owed because of the numerous
allowances and exempt status he claimed on his W-4
forms FFN2I The tax offenses with which petitioner
was charged are specific intent crimes that require the
defendant to have acted willfully.

FN2. Because petitioner filed a refund claim
for the entire amount withheld by his
employer in 1982, petitioner was also charged
under 18 U S C $ 287 with one count of
presenting a claim to an agency of the United
States knowing the claim to be false and
fraudulent

At trial, the evidence established that between 1982
and 1986, petitioner was involved in at least four civil
cases that *195 challenged various aspects of the
federal income tax system fFN31 In all four of those
cases, the plaintiffs were informed by the courts that
many of their arguments, including that they were not
taxpayers within the meaning of the tax laws, that
wages are not mcome, that the Sixteenth Amendment
does not authorize the imposition of an income tax on
individuals, and that the Sixteenth Amendment is
unenforceable, were frivolous or had been repeatedly
rejected by the courts. During this time period,
petitioner also attended at least two criminal tnals of
persons charged with tax offenses. In addition, there
was evidence that m 1980 or 1981 an attorney had
advised Cheek that the courts had rejected as frivolous
the claim that wages are not income. TFN41

FN3. In March 1982, Cheek and another
employee of the company sued American
Airlines to challenge the withholding of
federal income taxes In April 1982, Cheek
sued the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) in the
United States Tax Court, asserting that he was
not a taxpayer or a person for purposes of the
Internal Revenue Code and that his wages
were not income, and making several other
related claims. Cheek and four others also
filed an action against the Umted States and
the Commissioner of Internal Revenue m
Federal District Court, claiming that
withholding taxes from their wages violated
the Sixteenth Amendment. Finally, in 1985
Cheek filed claims with the IRS seeking to
have refunded the taxes withheld from his
wages in 1983 and 1984. When these claims
were not allowed, he brought suit in the
District Court claiming that the withholding
was an unconstitutional taking of his property
and that his wages were not income
In
dismissing this action asfrivolous,the District
Court imposed costs and attorneys fees of
$1,500 and a sanction under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 11 in the amount of $10,000
The Court of Appeals agreed that Cheek's
claims were frivolous, reduced the District
Court sanction to $5,000, and imposed an
additional sanction of $1,500 for bringing a
frivolous appeal.

FN4. The attorney also advised that despite
the Fifth Amendment, the filing of a tax return
was required and that a person could
challenge the constitutionality of the system
by suing for a refund after the taxes had been
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withheld or by putting himself "at nsk of
criminal prosecution"

Cheek represented himself at trial and testified in his
defense He admitted that he had not filed personal
income tax returns during the years in question He
testified that as early as 1978, he had begun attending
seminars sponsored *196 by, and following the advice
of, a group that believes, among other things, that the
federal tax system is unconstitutional. Some of the
speakers at these meetings were lawyers who purported
to give professional opinions about the invalidity of the
federal mcome tax laws. Cheek produced a letter from
an attorney statmg that the Sixteenth Amendment did
not authorize a tax on wages and salaries but only on
gam or profit Petitioner's defense was that, based on
the indoctrination he received from this group and from
his own study, he sincerely believed that the tax laws
were bemg unconstitutionally enforced and that his
actions during the 1980-1986 period were lawful He
therefore argued that he had acted without the
willfulness required for conviction of the various
offenses with which he was charged.
In the course of its instructions, the trial court advised
the jury that to prove "willfulness" the Government
must prove the voluntary and intentional violation of a
known legal duty, a burden that could not be proved by
showmg mistake, ignorance, or negligence. **608 The
court further advised the jury that an objectively
reasonable good-faith misunderstanding of the law
would negate willfulness, but mere disagreement with
the law would not The court described Cheek's beliefs
about the mcome tax system [FN51 and instructed the
jury that if it found that Cheek "honestly and reasonably
believed that *197 he was not required to pay mcome
taxes or to file tax returns," App. 81, a not guilty verdict
should be returned.

FN5. "The defendant has testified as to what
he states are his interpretations of the United
States Constitution, court opinions, common
law and other materials he has reviewed... He
has also introduced materials which contain
references to quotations from the Umted
States Constitution, court opinions, statutes,
and other sources.
"He testified he relied on his interpretations
and on these materials m concludmg that he
was not a person required to file mcome tax
returns for the year or years charged, was not
required to pay mcome taxes and that he could
claim exempt status on his W-4 forms, and
that he could claim refunds of all moneys
withheld" App 75-76

"Among other things Mr Cheek contends that
his wages from a pnvate employer, American
Airlines, does [sic ] not constitute income
under the Internal Revenue Service laws " Id
at 81

After several hours of deliberation, the jury sent a note
to the judge that stated in part:
" 'We have a basic disagreement between some of us
as to if Mr Cheek honestly & reasonably believed
that he was not required to pay mcome taxes

" 'Page 32 [the relevant jury instruction] discusses
good faith misunderstanding & disagreement. Is
there any additional clarification you can give us on
this point?'" W , a t 8 5 .
The District Judge responded with a supplemental
instruction containing the foliowmg statements.
"[A] person's opinion that the tax laws violate his
constitutional rights does not constitute a good faith
misunderstanding of the law.
Furthermore, a
person's disagreement with the government's tax
collection systems and policies does not constitute a
good faith misunderstanding of the law." Id, at 86.
At the end of the first day of deliberation, the jury sent
out another note saymg that it still could not reach a
verdict because " '[w]e are divided on the issue as to if
Mr. Cheek honestly & reasonably believed that he was
not required to pay mcome tax.'" Id, at 87. When the
jury resumed its deliberations, the District Judge gave
the jury an additional instruction. This instruction stated
in part that "[a]n honest but unreasonable belief is not
a defense and does not negate willfulness," id, at 88,
and that "[ajdvice or research resultmg m the
conclusion that wages of a privately employed person
are not mcome or that the tax laws are unconstitutional
is not objectively reasonable and cannot serve as the
basu for a good faith misunderstanding of the law
defense." Ibid The court also instructed the jury that
"[pjersistent refusal to acknowledge the law does not
constitute a good *198 faith misunderstanding of the
law." Ibid Approximately two hours later, the jury
returned a verdict finding petitioner guilty on all counts.
fFN61

FN6. A note signed by all 12 jurors also
informed the judge that although the jury
found petitioner guilty, several jurors wanted
to express their personal opinions of the case
and that notes from these individual jurors to
the court were "a complaint agamst the narrow
& hard expression under the constraints of the
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law " Id at 90 At least two notes from
individual jurors expressed the opinion that
petitioner sincerely believed m his cause even
though his beliefs might have been
unreasonable.

Petitioner appealed his convictions, arguing that the
District Court erred by instructing the jury that only an
objectively reasonable misunderstanding of the law
negates the statutory willfulness requirement. The
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
rejected that contention and affirmed the convictions.
882 F,2d 1263 (1989). In prior cases, the Seventh
Circuit had made clear that good-faith
misunderstanding of the law negates willfulness only if
the defendant's **609 beliefs are objectively
reasonable; in the Seventh Circuit, even actual
ignorance is not a defense unless the defendant's
ignorance was itself objectively reasonable. See, e g,
United States v. Buckner. 830 F 2d 102 {1987). In its
opmion in this case, the court noted that several
specified beliefs, including the beliefs that the tax laws
are unconstitutional and that wages are not income,
would not be objectively reasonable. [FN71 Because
the Seventh Circuit's *199 interpretation of "willfully"
as used in these statutes conflicts with the decisions of
several other Courts of Appeals, see, e g, United States
v. Whiteside. 810 F.2d 1306, 1310-1311 (CAS 1987):
United States v Phillips. 775 F 2d 262.263-264 (CA10
1985): United States v Aitken 755 F 2d 188. 191-193
(CA1 1985). we granted certiorari, 493 U.S. 1068. 110
S.Ct. 1108.107 L.Ed.2d 1016 (1990).

FN7. The opinion stated, 882 F 2d 1263.
1268-1269. n. 2 (CA7 1989). as follows:
"For the record, we note that the following
beliefs, which are stock arguments of the tax
protester movement, have not been, nor ever
will be, considered 'objectively reasonable' in
this circuit: "(1) the belief that the sixteenth
amendment to the constitution was improperly
ratified and therefore never came into being;
"(2) the belief that the sixteenth amendment is
unconstitutional generally;
"(3) the belief that the income tax violates the
takings clause of the fifth amendment;
"(4) the belief that the tax laws are
unconstitutional;
"(5) the belief that wages are not income and
therefore are not subject to federal income tax
laws;
"(6) the belief that filing a tax return violates
the privilege agamst self-incrimination; and
"(7) the belief that Federal Reserve Notes do
not constitute cash or income

"Millet > Lmted States N68 1 2d 2V>. 219-4 1
(7th Cir.1989), Bittknet, 830 h 2d at 102.
United States v. Dube. 820 F 2d 886. 891 < 7th
Cir.1987): Coleman v Comm'r 791 F2d68.
70-71 (7thCir.1986); Moore 627F2dat833
We have no doubt that this list will increase
with time."

II
[11 The general rule that ignorance of the law or a
mistake of law is no defense to criminal prosecution is
deeply rooted in the American legal system. See, e g,
United States v. Smith. 5 Wheat. 153. 182. 5 L.Ed. 57
(1820) (Livmgston, J., dissenting); Barlow v United
States. 7 Pet. 404. 411. 8 L.Ed. 728 (1833): Reynolds
v. United States. 98 U S 145. 167. 25 L.Fd. 244
(1879). Shevhn-Carpenter Co v Minnesota. 218 U S
57. 68. 30 S.Ct. 663. 666. 54 L.Ed. 930 (1910):
Lambert v California. 355 U S 225.228. 78 S Ct. 240.
242. 2 L.Ed.2d 228 (1957): Lwarotav United States
471 U.S. 419. 441. 105 S.Ct 2084. 2096. 85 L.Ed.2d
434(1985) (WHITE, J , dissenting); O. Holmes, The
Common Law 47-48 (1881). Based on the notion that
the law is definite and knowable, the common law
presumed that every person knew the law. This
common-law rule has been applied by the Court in
numerous cases construing criminal statutes. See, e g,
United States v. International Minerals & Chemical
Corp.. 402 US. 558. 91 S Ct. 1697. 29 L Ed.2d 178
(1971): Hamhns v United States, 418 U.S. 87.
119-124. 94 S.Ct. 2887. 2808-2911. 41 L.Ed.2d 590
(1974): Bo\ce Motor Lines, Inc v United States 342
U.S. 337. 72 S.Ct 329.96 L.EA 367 (1952).
The proliferation of statutes and regulations has
sometimes made it difficult for the average citizen to
know and comprehend *200 the extent of the duties and
obligations imposed by the tax laws. Congress has
accordmgly softened the impact of the common-law
presumption by making specific intent to violate the
law an element of certain federal criminal tax offenses
Thus, the Court almost 60 years ago interpreted the
statutory term "willfully" as used in the federal criminal
tax statutes as carving out an exception to the
traditional rule. This special treatment of criminal tax
offenses is largely due to the complexity of the tax
laws. In United States v Murdock 290 U.S 389 54
S.Ct. 223. 78 L.Ed. 381 (1933), the Court recognized
that:
"Congress did not intend that a person, by reason of
a bona fide misunderstanding as **610 to his liability
for the tax, as to his duty to make a return, or as to
the adequacy of the records he maintained, should
become a criminal by his mere failure to measure up
to the prescribed standard of conduct." Id, at 3%. 54
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S.Ct., at 226.
The Court held that the defendant was entitled to an
instruction with respect to whether he acted in good
faith based on his actual belief. In Murdoch, the Court
interpreted the term "willfully" as used in the criminal
tax statutes generally to mean "an act done with a bad
purpose," id. at 394, 54 S.Ct. at 225, or with "an evil
motive," id. at 395. 54 S.Ct.. at 225.
Subsequent decisions have refined this proposition. In
United States v. Bishop. 412 U.S. 346, 93 S.Ct. 2008,
36 L.Ed.2d 941 (1973), we described the term
"willfully" as connoting "a voluntary, intentional
violation of a known legal duty," id. at 360, 93 S.Ct,
at 2017. and did so with specific reference to the "bad
faith or evil intent" language employed in Murdock.
Still later, United States v. Pomponio. 429 U.S. 10, 97
S.Ct 22.50L.Ed.2d 1211976) (per curiam), addressed
a situation in which several defendants had been
charged with willfully filing false tax returns. The jury
was given an instruction on willfulness similar to the
standard set forth in Bishop. In addition, it was
instructed that" '[g]ood motive alone is never a defense
where the act done or omitted is a crime.' " Id. at 11,
97 S.Ct. at 23. The defendants were convicted but the
Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that the latter
instruction *201 was improper because the statute
required afindingof bad purpose or evil motive. Ibid.
We reversed the Court of Appeals, stating that "the
Court of Appeals incorrectly assumed that the reference
to an 'evil motive' in United States v. Bishop, supra, and
prior cases," ibid, "requires proof of any motive other
than an intentional violation of a known legal duty.'*
Id. at 12, 97 S.Ct, at 23. As "the other Courts of
Appeals that have considered the question have
recognized, willfulness in this context simply means a
voluntary, intentional violation of a known legal duty."
Ibid. We concluded that after instructing the jury on
willfulness, "[a]n additional instruction on good faith
was unnecessary." Id., at 13. 97 S.Ct. at 24. Taken
together, Bishop and Pomponio conclusively establish
that the standard for die statutory willfulness
requirement is the "voluntary, intentional violation of a
known legal duty."

m
Cheek accepts the Pomponio definition of willfulness,
Brief for Petitioner 5, and n. 4, 13,36; Reply Brief for
Petitioner 4, 6-7, 11, 13, but asserts that the District
Court's instructions and the Court of Appeals' opinion
departed from that definition.
In particular, he
challenges the ruling that a good-faith
misunderstanding of the law or a good-faith belief that
one is not violating the law, if it is to negate willfulness,

must be objectively reasonable. We agree that the
Court of Appeals and the District Court erred in this
respect.
A
I"21f31f41 Willfulness, as construed by our prior
decisions in criminal tax cases, requires the
Government to prove that the law imposed a duty on
the defendant, that the defendant knew of this duty, and
that he voluntarily and intentionally violated that duty.
We dealfirstwith the case where the issue is whether
the defendant knew of the duty purportedly imposed by
the provision of the statute or regulation he is accused
of violating, a case in which there is no claim that the
provision *202 at issue is invalid. In such a case, if the
Government proves actual knowledge of the pertinent
legal duty, the prosecution, without more, has satisfied
the knowledge component of the willfulness
requirement.
But carrying this burden requires
negating a defendant's claim of ignorance of the law or
a claim that because of a misunderstanding of the law,
he had a good-faith belief that he was not violating any
of the provisions of the tax laws. This is so **611
because one cannot be aware that the law imposes a
duty upon him and yet be ignorant of it, misunderstand
the law, or believe that the duty does not exist In the
end, the issue is whether, based on all the evidence, the
Government has proved that the defendant was aware
of the duty at issue, which cannot be true if the jury
credits a good-faith misunderstanding and belief
submission, whether or not the claimed belief or
misunderstanding is objectively reasonable.
In this case, if Cheek asserted that he truly believed
that the Internal Revenue Code did not purport to treat
wages as income, and the jury believed him, the
Government would not have carried its burden to prove
willfulness, however unreasonable a court might deem
such a belief. Of course, in deciding whether to credit
Cheek's good-faith belief claim, the jury would be free
to consider any admissible evidence from any source
showing that Cheek was aware of his duty to file a
return and to treat wages as income, including evidence
showing his awareness of the relevant provisions of the
Code or regulations, of court decisions rejecting his
interpretation of the tax law, of authoritative rulings of
the Internal Revenue Service, or of any contents of the
personal income tax return forms and accompanying
instructions that made it plain that wages should be
returned as income. TFN81
FN8. Cheek recognizes that a "defendant who
knows what the law is and who disagrees with
it ... does not have a bona fide
misunderstanding defense," but asserts that "a
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defendant who has a bona fide
misunderstanding of [the law] does not 'know'
his legal duty and lacks willfulness." Brief
for Petitioner 29, and n. 13. The Reply Brief
for Petitioner, at 13, states: "We are in no
way suggesting that Cheek or anyone else is
immune from criminal prosecution if he
knows what the law is, but believes it should
be otherwise, and therefore violates it." See
also Tr. of Oral Arg. 9, 11, 12, 15, 17.

f5ir61 *203 We thus disagree with the Court of
Appeals' requirement that a claimed good-faith belief
must be objectively reasonable if it is to be considered
as possibly negating the Government's evidence
purporting to show a defendant's awareness of the legal
duty at issue.
Knowledge and belief are
characteristically questions for the factfinder, in this
case the jury. Characterizing a particular belief as not
objectively reasonable transforms the inquiry into a
legal one and would prevent the jury from considering
it. It would of course be proper to exclude evidence
having no relevance or probative value with respect to
willfulness; but it is not contrary to common sense, let
alone impossible, for a defendant to be ignorant of his
duty based on an irrational belief that he has no duty,
and forbidding the jury to consider evidence that might
negate willfulness would raise a serious question under
the Sixth Amendment's jury trial provision.
Cf.
Francis v. Franklin. 471 U.S. 307. 105 S.Ct. 1965. 85
L.Ed.2d 344(1985): Sandstrom v. Montana. 442 U.S.
510.99 S.Ct 2450. 61 LJEd.2d 39 (1979): Morissette
v. United States. 342 U.S. 246. 72 S.Ct. 240. 96 L.Ed.
288 (1952V It is common ground that this Court,
where possible, interprets congressional enactments so
as to avoid raising serious constitutional questions.
See, e.g., Edward J. DeBartolo Cory, v. Florida Gulf
Coast Building & Construction Trades Council. 485
U.S. 568. 575. 108 S.Ct 1392. 1397. 99 L.E&2d 645
(1988): Crowell v Benson, 285 U.S. 22. 62. and n. 30.
52 S.Ct 285. 296. and n. 30. 76 L.E& 598 (1932):
Public Citizen v. Department of Justice. 491 U.S. 440.
465-466.109 S.Ct 2558.2S72-2S73. IPS L.E&2d 377
(1989).
[7] It was therefore error to instruct the jury to
disregard evidence of Cheek's understanding that,
within the meaning of the tax laws, he was not a person
required to file a return or to pay income taxes and that
wages are not taxable income, as incredible as such
misunderstandings of and beliefs about the law might
be.
Of course, the more unreasonable the
assertedbeliefs *204 or misunderstandings are, the more
likely the jury will consider them to be nothing more
than simple **612 disagreement with known legal
duties imposed by the tax laws and will find that the

Government has carried its burden of proving
knowledge.
B
[8] Cheek asserted in the trial court that he should be
acquitted because he believed in good faith that the
income tax law is unconstitutional as applied to him
and thus could not legally impose any duty upon him of
which he should have been aware. TFN91 Such a
submission is unsound, not because *205 Cheek's
constitutional arguments are not objectively reasonable
or frivolous, which they surely are, but because the
Murdock-Pomponio line of cases does not support such
a position. Those cases construed the willfulness
requirement in the criminal provisions of the Internal
Revenue Code to require proof of knowledge of the
law. This was because in "our complex tax system,
uncertainty often arises even among taxpayers who
earnestly wish to follow the law," and " '[i]t is not the
purpose of the law to penalize frank difference of
opinion or innocent errors made despite the exercise of
reasonable care.' " United Stares v. Bishop. 412 U.S.
346. 360-361. 93 S.Ct 2008. 2017-2018. 36 L.Ed.2d
941 (1973) (quoting Spies v. United States. 317 U.S.
492.496. 63 S.Ct 364.367. 87 L.Ed. 418 (1943)).

FN9. In his opening and reply briefs and at
oral argument, Cheek asserts that this case
does not present the issue whether a claim of
unconstitutionality would serve to negate
willfulness and that we need not address the
issue. Brief for Petitioner 13; Reply Brief for
Petitioner 5, 11, 12; Tr. of Oral Arg. 6, 13.
Cheek testified at trial, however, that "[i]t is
my belief that the law is being enforced
unconstitutionally." App. 60.
He also
produced a letter from counsel advising him
thatw Tinally you make a valid contention ...
that Congress1 power to tax comes from
Article L Section 8. Clause 1 of the U.S.
Constitution, and not from the Sixteenth
Amendment and that the [latter], construed
with Article 1, Section 2, Clause 3. never
authorized a tax on wages and salaries, but
only on gain and profit." Id., at 57. We note
also that the jury asked for "the portion [of the
transcript] wherein Mr. Cheek stated he was
attempting to test the constitutionality of the
income tax laws," Tr. 1704, and that the trial
judge later instructed the jury that an opinion
that the tax laws violate a person's
constitutional rights does not constitute a
good-faith misunderstanding of the law. We
also note that at oral argument Cheek's
counsel observed that "personal belief that a
known statute is unconstitutional smacks of
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knowledge with existing law, but
disagreement with it." Tr. of Oral Arg. 5.
He also opined:
"If the person believes as a personal belief that
known-law known to them
[sic] is
unconstitutional, I submit that that would not
be a defense, because what the person is really
saying is I know what the law is, for
constitutional reasons I have made my own
determination that it is invalid. I am not
suggesting that that is a defense.
"However, if the person was told by a lawyer
or by an accountant erroneously that the
statute is unconstitutional, and it's my
professional advice to you that you don't have
to follow it, then you have got a little different
situation. This is not that case." Id., at 6.
Given this posture of the case, we perceive no
reason not to address the significance of
Cheek's constitutional claims to the issue of
willfulness.

Claims that some of the provisions of the tax code are
unconstitutional are submissions of a different order.
fFNlO] They do not arise from innocent mistakes
caused by the complexity of the Internal Revenue Code.
Rather, they reveal full knowledge of the provisions at
issue and a studied conclusion, however wrong, that
those provisions are invalid **613 and unenforceable.
*206 Thus in this case, Cheek paid his taxes for years,
but after attending various seminars and based on his
own study, he concluded that the income tax laws could
not constitutionally require him to pay a tax.

FN10. In United Scares v. Murdoch, 290 U.S.
389, 54 S.Ct. 223. 78 LJE& 381 (1933).
discussed supra, at 609-610, the defendant
Murdock was summoned to appear before a
revenue agent for examination. Questions
were put to him, which he refused to answer
for fear of self-incrimination under state law.
He was indicted for refusing to give
testimony and supply information contrary to
the pertinent provisions of the Internal
Revenue Code. This Court affirmed the
reversal of Murdock's conviction, holding that
the trial court erred in refusing to give an
instruction directing the jury to consider
Murdock's asserted claim of a good-faith,
actual belief that because of the Fifth
Amendment he was privileged not to answer
the questions put to him. It is thus the case
that Murdock's asserted belief was grounded
in the Constitution, but it was a claim of
privilege not to answer, not a claim that any

provision of the tax laws were
unconstitutional, and not a claim for which the
tax laws provided procedures to entertain and
resolve. Cheek's position at trial, in contrast,
was that the tax laws were unconstitutional as
applied to him.

We do not believe that Congress contemplated that
such a taxpayer, without risking criminal prosecution,
could ignore the duties imposed upon him by the
Internal Revenue Code and refuse to utilize the
mechanisms provided by Congress to present his claims
of invalidity to the courts and to abide by their
decisions. There is no doubt that Cheek, from year to
year, was free to pay the tax that the law purported to
require, file for a refund and, if denied, present his
claims of invalidity, constitutional or otherwise, to the
courts. See 26U.S.C. 5 7422. Also, without paying the
tax, he could have challenged claims of tax deficiencies
in the Tax Court, § 6213, with the right to appeal to a
higher court if unsuccessful. § 7482(a)(1). Cheek
took neither course in some years, and when he did was
unwilling to accept the outcome. As we see it, he is in
no position to claim that his good-faith belief about the
validity of the Internal Revenue Code negates
willfulness or provides a defense to criminal
prosecution under S§ 7201 and 7203. Of course,
Cheek wasfreein this very case to present his claims of
invalidity and have them adjudicated, but like
defendants in criminal cases in other contexts, who
"willfully" refuse to comply with the duties placed upon
them by the law, he must take the risk of being wrong.
We thus hold that in a case like this, a defendant's
views about the validity of the tax statutes are irrelevant
to the issue of willfulness and need not be heard by the
jury, and, if they are, an instruction to disregard them
would be proper. For this purpose, it makes no
difference whether the claims of invalidity are frivolous
or have substance. It was therefore not error in this
case for the District Judge to instruct the jury not to
consider Cheek's claims that the tax laws were
unconstitutional. However, it was error for the court to
instruct *207 the jury that petitioner's asserted beliefs
that wages are not income and that he was not a
taxpayer within the meaning of the Internal Revenue
Code should not be considered by the jury in
determining whether Cheek had acted willfully. [FN 111

FN11. Cheek argues that applying to him the
Court of Appeals' standard of objective
reasonableness violates his rights under the
First, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments of the
Constitution. Since we have invalidated the
challenged standard on statutory grounds, we
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need not address these submissions

IV
For the reasons set forth in the opimon above, the
judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated, and the
case is remanded for further proceedings consistent
with this opimon.
// is so ordered

Justice SOUTER took no part m the consideration or
decision of this case.

saying that a "willful" violation is established by full
knowledge of a statutory requirement, but is not
established by full knowledge of a requirement
explicitly imposed by regulation or order
Thus,
today's opinion works a revolution in past practice,
subjecting to criminal penalties taxpayers who do not
comply with Treasury Regulations that are in their view
contrary to the Internal Revenue Code, Treasury
Rulmgs that are in then* view contrary to the
regulations, and even IRS auditor pronouncements that
are m their view contrary to Treasury Rulmgs. The
law already provides considerable incentive for
taxpayers to be careful in ignoring any official assertion
of tax liability, smce it contains civil penalties that
apply even m the event of a good-faith mistake, see,
e g, 26US.C. SS6651. 6653. To impose in addition
criminal penalties for misinterpretation of such a
complex body of law is a startling innovation mdeed.

Justice SCAL1A, concurring m the judgment.
I concur in the judgment of the Court because our
cases have consistently held that the failure to pay a tax
in the good-faith belief that it is not legally owing is not
"willful" I do not jom the Court's opimon because I
db not agree with the test for willfulness that it directs
the Court of Appeals to apply on remand.
As the Court acknowledges, our opinions from the
1930's to the 1970's have interpreted the word
"willfully" in the criminal tax statutes as requiring the
"bad purpose" or "evil motive" of "intentionally]
violating] a known legal duty." See, eg, United
States v Pomponio. 429 U S. 10. 12, 97 S.Ct. 22. 23.
50L.Ed.2dl2(1976): United States v Murdock 290
U.S. 389.394-395.54 S.Ct 223.225-226.78 L.Ed. 381
(1933). It seems to me that today's opimon squarely
reverses that long-established statutory construction
**614 when it says that a good-faith erroneous belief m
the unconstitutionality of a tax law is no defense. It is
quite impossible to say that a statute which *208 one
believes unconstitutional represents a "known legal
duty." See Mar bury v Madison, 1 Cranch 137.
177-178. 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803).
Although the facts of the present case involve
erroneous reliance upon the Constitution m ignoring the
otherwise "known legal duty" imposed by the tax
statutes, the Court's new interpretation applies also to
erroneous reliance upon a tax statute in ignoring the
otherwise "known legal duty" of a regulation, and to
erroneous reliance upon a regulation m ignoring the
otherwise "known legal duty" of a tax assessment.
These situations as well meet the opmion's crucial test
of "reveal[ing] full knowledge of the provisions at issue
and a studied conclusion, however wrong, that those
provisions are invalid and unenforceable," ante, at
612-613
There is, moreover, no rational basis for

I find it impossible to understand how one can derive
from the lonesome word "willfully" the proposition
that belief in the nonexistence of a textual prohibition
excuses liability, but belief m the invalidity (le, the
legal nonexistence) of a textual prohibition does not.
One may say, as the law does *209 m many contexts,
that "willfully" refers to consciousness of the act but
not to consciousness that the act is unlawful. See, e g,
American Surety Co of New York v Sullivan, 7 F 2d
605.606 (CA2 1925) (L. Hand, J.); cf. UnitedStates v
International Minerals A Chemical Corp.. 402 U S
558. 563-565. 91 S.Ct 1697. 1700-1702. 29 L.Ed2d
178(1971). Or alternatively, one may say, as we have
said until today with respect to the tax statutes, that
"willfully" refers to consciousness of both the act and
its illegality. But it seems to me impossible to say that
the word refers to consciousness that some legal text
exists, without consciousness that that legal text is
binding, i.e, with the good-faith belief that it is not a
valid law. Perhaps such a test for criminal liability
would make sense (though in a field as complicated as
federal tax law, I doubt it), but some text other than the
mere word "willfully" would have to be employed to
describe it—and that textis not ours to write.
Because today's opimon abandons clear and
longstanding precedent to impose criminal liability
where taxpayers have had no reason to expect it,
because the new contours of criminal liability have no
basis in the statutory text and because I strongly
suspect that those new contours make no sense even as
a policy matter, I concur only m the judgment of the
Court.

Justice BLACKMUN, with
MARSHALL joins, dissentmg
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Justice

It seems to me that we are concerned in this case not
with "the complexity of the tax laws," ante, at 609, but
with the income tax law in its most elementary and
basic aspect: Is a wage earner a taxpayer and are wages
income?
The Court acknowledges that the conclusively
established standard for willfulness under the applicable
statutes is the " Voluntary, **615 intentional violation
of a known legal duty.' " Ante, at 610. See United
States v. Bishop. 412 U.S. 346. 360. 93 S.Ct. 2008.
2017. 36 L.Ed.2d 941 (1973). and United States v.
Pomponio. 429 U.S. 10. 12.97S.Ct.22.23.50L.Ed.2d
12(1976). That being so, it is incomprehensible to me
how, in this day, more than 70 years after the institution
of our *210 present federal income tax system with the
passage of the Income Tax Act of 1913, 38 Stat. 166,
any taxpayer of competent mentality can assert as his
defense to charges of statutory willfulness the
proposition that the wage he receives for his labor is not
income, irrespective of a cult that says otherwise and
advises the gullible to resist income tax collections.
One might note in passing that this particular taxpayer,
after all, was a licensed pilot for one of our major
commercial airlines; he presumably was a person of at
least minimum intellectual competence.
The District Court's instruction that an objectively
reasonable and good-faith misunderstanding of the law
negates willfulness lends further, rather than less,
protection to this defendant, for it adds an additional
hurdle for the prosecution to overcome. Petitioner
should be grateful for this further protection, rather than
be opposed to it.
This Court's opinion today, I fear, will encourage
taxpayers to cling to frivolous views of the law in the
hope of convincing a jury of their sincerity. If that
ensues, I suspect we have gone beyond the limits of
common sense.
While I may not agree with every word the Court of
Appeals has enunciated in its opinion, I would affirm its
judgment in this case. I therefore dissent.
I l l S.Ct. 604, 498 U.S. 192, 112 L.Ed.2d 617, 59
USLW 4049, 67 A.F.T.R.2d 91-344, 91-1 USTC P
50,012
END OF DOCUMENT
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Before you can convict the defendant, Thomas Smith

of Tax

Evasion - Failure to Make, Render, Sign, en Verify a Tax: Re ti in i

:i n

that the State has proven beyond a reasonable doubt each and every
one of the foil Loving elements:
'1
of Utah, Thomas Smith;
2

Intentionally or wi llfully evaded;

4

Failed, to make

he
render, sign, or verify any return or to

rendered, signed, ox verified any false or fraudulent return of"
statement, or he supplied any false or fraudulent information.

all of the elements of Tax Evasion - Failure to Make, Render, Sign
or Verify a Tax Return, in Count I of the Amended Information
w i si It: f ,:l i i :!, I: ;

I Il ti

Oi it I: h iii 11 II m m t

I i a 111 I „

evidence establishes beyond a reasonable doubt all mf the elements
of Tax Evasion
Pf't' i ii1 „

I'

I

Failure to Make, Render
"I (" 1

1

Sign or Verify a Tax
nense„

INSTRUCTION MO,

3*^

Before you can convict the defendant, Thomas Smith, of Tax
Evasion - Willful Evasion of Income Tax, in Count II of the Amended
Information, you must find from the evidence that the State has
proven beyond a reasonable doubt each and every one of the
following elements:
1.

On or before April 15, 1996, in Salt Lake County, State

of Utah, Thomas Smith;
2.

Intentionally or willfully attempted;

3.

To evade or defeat any applicable tax or requirement of

Title 59 or the payment thereof due on his income earned in 1995.
If the evidence fails to establish beyond a reasonable doubt
all of the elements of Tax Evasion - Willful Evasion of Income Tax,
in Count II of the Amended Information, you must find the defendant
not guilty. On the other hand, if the evidence establishes beyond
a reasonable doubt all of the elements of Tax Evasion - Willful
Evasion of Income Tax, you must find the defendant guilty of the
offense.

IMSTRUCTIOM MO.

££

Utah Code, Section 76- 2-1 03, states:
A person engages in conduct:
(1) Intentionally, or with intent or willfully u i th
respect to the nature of his conduct or to a result of
his conduct, when it is his conscious objective or desire
to engage in the conduct or cause the result,
(2) Knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to his
conduct or to circumstances surrounding his conduct when
he is aware of the nature of his conduct or the existing
circumstances. A person acts knowingly, or with
knowledge, with respect to a result of his conduct when
he is aware that his conduct is reasonably certain to
cause the result.
(3) Recklessly, or Maliciously, with respect t(:i
circumstances surrounding his conduct or the result of
his conduct when he is aware of but consciously
disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the
circumstances exist or the result will occur. The risk
must be of such a nature and degree that its disregard
constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care
that an ordinary person would exercise under all the
circumstances as viewed from the actor's standpoint.
(4) With criminal negligence or is criminally negligent
with respect to circumstances surrounding his conduct or
the result of his conduct when he ought to be aware of a
substantial and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances
exist or the result will occur. The risk must be of such
a nature and degree that the failure to perceive it
constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care
that an ordinary person would exercise in all the
circumstances as viewed from the actor's standpoint,

JURY INSTRUCTION
The defendant has introduced evidence of advice he heard given by speakers at
meetings, tape recorded lectures, essays, pamphlets, court opinions, and other material
that he testified he relied on in concluding that he was not a person required to file an
income tax return for 1995. This evidence has bean admitted solely for the purpose of
aiding you in determining whether or not the defendant's failure to timely file a tax return
for 1995 was knowing and willful and you should not consider it for any other purpose.
You are not to consider this evidence as containing any law that you are to apply in
reaching your verdicts, because all of the law applicable to this case is set forth in these
instructions.

INSTRUCTION NO.
! ! :: i

:

iit

>?Ar

h i s t r i i : ' t e :i tl: :i at t l le a< it: i: i:i ssioi i :: f defei idai it s

Exhibit #23 A W is not, entered into evidence for any substantive
value but tor .., limitec purpose of showing the defendant's
state of mind on or about January 1, 1995 to April 16, i^w.
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State ?f Utah
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'-DER
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l'i] '""'"""is S m i t.h,
Defendaut dji'.;J Appe 11 di11,

I h i s matter is before the court on a motion to allow
A ppellant to file his own pro se brief in addition to, and
separate from, the brief filed on his behalf by his counsel :f
record, Salt Lake Legal Defender Association (LDA).
As A p p e n a n t » s counsel of record in this court, LDA i s
obligated to be an active advocate in behalf the client and
support the client's appeal to the best of 'its ability. See
State v. Wells. 2000 UT App 304, 14, 13 P.3d 1056 (citing 3cate
v. Clayton, 639 P.2d 168, 169 (Utah 1981)), If Appellant wishes
to raise issues that LDA believes are meritless or otherwise
unsupported, LDA should incorporate those issues into its brief
under the guidelines of Anders v. California. 386 U.S. 738 (1967!
and State v. Clayton. 639 P.2d 168 (Utah 1981). This procedure
allows the court to fully evaluate all of Appellant's issues on
appeal in the most effective and efficient format.
t

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the mo! J "
his own, pro se brief is denied.
DATED r n i - t<jun

FOR THE COURT:

Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on April 24, 2002, a true and correct copy
of the foregoing ORDER was deposited in the United States mail to
the parties listed below:
BRETT J. DELPORTO
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
160 E 300 S 6TH FL
PO BOX 140854
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114
RONALD S. FUJINO
LINDA M. JONES
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION
424 E 500 S STE 300
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111
Dated this April 24, 2002.

iy Clerk
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76-3-201. Definitions - Sentences or combination of sentences allowed — Civil penalties — Restitution
— Hearing.
(1) As used in this section:
(a) "Conviction" includes a:
(i) judgment of guilt; and
(ii) plea of guilty.
(b) "Criminal activities" means any offense of which the defendant is
convicted or any other criminal conduct for which the defendant admits
responsibility to the sentencing court with or without an admission of
committing the criminal conduct.
(c) "Pecuniary damages" means all special damages, but not general
damages, which a person could recover against the defendant in a civil
action arising out of the facts or events constituting the defendant's
criminal activities and includes the money equivalent of property taken,
destroyed, broken, or otherwise harmed, and losses including earnings
and medical expenses.
(d) "Restitution0 means full, partial, or nominal payment for pecuniary
damages to a victim, including the accrual of interest from the time of
sentencing, insured damages, and payment for expenses to a governmental entity for extradition or transportation and as further defined in
Subsection (4Xc).
(e) (i) "Victim" means any person whom the court determines has
suffered pecuniary damages as a result of the defendant's criminal
activities.
(ii) "Victim'* does not include any copartieipaiit in the defendants
criminal activities.
(2) Within the limits prescribed by this chapter, a court may sentence a
person convicted of an offense to any one of the following sentences or
combination of them:
(a) to pay a fine;
(b) to removal or disqualification from public or private office;
(c) to probation unless otherwise specifically provided by law;
(d) to imprisonment;
(e) to life imprisonment;
(f) on or after April 27, 1991, to life in prison without parole; or
(g) to death.
(3) (a) This chapter does not deprive a court of authority conferred bv law
to:
(i) forfeit property;
(ii) dissolve a corporation;
(iii) suspend or cancel a license;
(iv) permit removal of a person from office;
(v) cite for contempt; or
(vi) impose any other civil penalty,
(b) A civil penalty may be included in a sentence,
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(4) (a) (i) When a person is convicted of criminal activity that has resulted
in pecuniary damages, in addition to any other sentence it may
impose, the court shall order that the defendant make restitution to
victims of crime as provided in this subsection, or for conduct for
which the defendant has agreed to make restitution as part of a plea
agreement. For purposes of restitution, a victim has the meaning as
denned in Subsection (lXe).
(ii) In determining whether restitution is appropriate, the court
shall follow the criteria and procedures as provided in Subsections
(4XO and (4Xd).
(iii) If the court finds the defendant owes restitution, the clerk of
the court shall enter an order of complete restitution as denned in
Subsection (8Kb) on the civil judgment docket and provide notice of
the order to the parties.
(iv) The order is considered a legal judgment enforceable under the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and the person in whose favor the
restitution order is entered may seek enforcement of the restitution
order in accordance with the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. In
addition, the Department of Corrections may, on behalf of the person
in whose favor the restitution order is entered, enforce the restitution
order as judgment creditor under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
(v) If the defendant fails to obey a court order for payment of
restitution and the victim or department elects to pursue collection of
the order by civil process, the victim shall be entitled to recover
reasonable attorney's fees.
(vi) A judgment ordering restitution constitutes a lien when recorded in a judgment docket and shall have the same effect and is
subject to the same rules as a judgment for money in a civil action.
Interest shall accrue on the amount ordered from the time of sentencing.
(vii) The Department of Corrections shall make rules permitting
the restitution payments to be credited to principal first and the
remainder of payments credited to interest in accordance with Title
63, Chapter 46a, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act.
(b) (i) If a defendant has been extradited to this state under Title 77,
Chapter 30, Extradition, to resolve pending criminal charges and is
convicted of criminal activity in the county to which he has been
returned, the court may, in addition to any other sentence it may
impose, order that the defendant make restitution for costs expended
by any governmental entity for the extradition.
(ii) In determining whether restitution is appropriate, the court
shall consider the criteria in Subsection (4Xc).
(c) In determining restitution, the court shall determine complete
restitution and court-ordered restitution.
(i) Complete restitution means the restitution necessary to compensate a victim for all losses caused by the defendant.
(ii) Court-ordered restitution means the restitution the court having criminal jurisdiction orders the defendant to pay as a part of the
criminal sentence at the time of sentencing.
(iii) Complete restitution and court-ordered restitution shall be
determined as provided in Subsection (8).
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PUNISHMENTS

76-3-201

(d) (i) If the court determines that restitution is appropriate or inappropriate under this subsection, the court shall make the reasons for
the decision a part of the court record.
(ii) In any civil action brought by a victim to enforce the judgment,
the defendant shall be entitled to offset any amounts that have been
paid as part of court-ordered restitution to the victim.
(iii) A judgment ordering restitution constitutes a lien when recorded in a judgment docket and shall have the same effect and is
subject to the same rules as a judgment for money in a civil action.
Interest shall accrue on the amount ordered from the time of sentencing.
(iv) The Department of Corrections shall make rules permitting the
restitution payments to be credited to principal first and the remainder of payments credited to interest in accordance with Title 63,
Chapter 46a, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act.
(e) If the defendant objects to the imposition, amount, or distribution of
the restitution, the court shall at the time of sentencing allow the
defendant a full hearing on the issue.
(5) (a) In addition to any other sentence the court may impose, the court
shall order the defendant to pay restitution of governmental transportation expenses if the defendant was:
(i) transported pursuant to court order from one county to another
within the state at governmental expense to resolve pending criminal
charges;
(ii) charged with a felony or a class A, B, or C misdemeanor; and
(iii) convicted of a crime.
(b) The court may not order the defendant to pay restitution of
governmental transportation expenses if any of the following apply:
(i) the defendant is charged with an infraction or on a subsequent
failure to appear a warrant is issued for an infraction; or
(ii) the defendant was not transported pursuant to a court order.
(c) (i) Restitution of governmental transportation expenses under Subsection (5XaXi) shall be calculated according to the following schedule:
(A) $75 for up to 100 miles a defendant ia transported;
(B) $125 for 100 up to 200 miles a defendant is transported;
and
(C) $250 for 200 miles or more a defendant is transported,
(ii) The schedule of restitution under Subsection (5XcXi) applies to
each defendant transported regardless of the number of defendants
actually transported in a single trip.
(6) (a) If a statute under which the defendant was convicted mandates that
one of three stated minimum terms shall be imposed, the court shall order
imposition of the term of middle severity unless there are circumstances in
aggravation or mitigation of the crime.
(b) Prior to or at the time of sentencing, either party may submit a
statement identifying circumstances in aggravation or mitigation or
presenting additional facts. If the statement is in writing, it shall be filed
with the court and served on the opposing party at least four days prior to
the time set for sentencing.
(c) In determining whether there are circumstances that justify imposition of the highest or lowest term, the court may consider the record in
59
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the case, the probation officer's report, other reports, including reports
received under Section 76-3-404, statements in aggravation or mitigation
submitted by the prosecution or the defendant, and any further evidence
introduced at the sentencing hearing.
(d) The court shall set forth on the record the facts supporting and
reasons for imposing the upper or lower term.
(e) In determining a just sentence, the court shall consider sentencing
guidelines regarding aggravating and mitigating circumstances promulgated by the Sentencing Commission.
(7) If during the commission of a crime described as child kidnaping, rape of
a child, object rape of a child, sodomy upon a child, or sexual abuse of a child,
the defendant causes substantial bodily injury to the child, and if the charge is
set forth in the information or indictment and admitted by the defendant, or
found true by a judge or jury at trial, the defendant shall be sentenced to the
highest minimum term in state prison. This subsection takes precedence over
any conflicting provision of law.
(8) (a) For the purpose of determining restitution for an offense, the offens*
shall include any criminal conduct admitted by the defendant to the
sentencing court or to which the defendant agrees to pay restitution. A
victim of an offense, that involves as an element a scheme, a conspiracy, or
a pattern of criminal activity, includes any person directly harmed by the
defendant's criminal conduct in the course of the scheme, conspiracy, or
pattern.
(b) In determining the monetary sum and other conditions for complete
restitution, the court shall consider all relevant facts, including:
ii) the cost of the damage or loss if the offense resulted in damage
to or loss or destruction of property of a victim of the offense;
(ii) the cost of necessary medical and related professional services
and devices relating to physical, psychiatric, and psychological care,
including nonmedical care and treatment rendered in accordance with
a method of healing recognized by the law of the place of treatment;
the cost of necessary physical and occupational therapy and rehabilitation; and the income lost by the victim as a result of the offense if the
offense resulted in bodily injury to a victim; and
(iii) the cost of necessary funeral and related services if the offense
resulted in the death of a victim.
(c) In determining the monetary sum and other conditions for courtordered restitution, the court shall consider the factors listed in Subsection (8Kb) and;
(i) the financial resources of the defendant and the burden that
payment of restitution will impose, with regard to the other obligations of the defendant;
(ii) the ability of the defendant to pay restitution on an installment
basis or on other conditions to be fixed by the court;
(iii) the rehabilitative effect on the defendant of the payment of
restitution and the method of payment; and
(iv) other circumstances which the court determines make restitution inappropriate.
(d) The court may decline to make an order or may defer entering an
order of restitution if the court determines that the complication and
prolongation of the sentencing process,
as a result of considering an order
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of restitution under this subsection, substantially outweighs the need to
provide restitution to the victim.
H i s t o r y : C. 1963, 76-3-201, e n a c t e d by L.
1973, c h . 196, § 76-3 201; 1979, c h . 69, § 1;
t 9 6 1 , c h . 59, § 1; 1963, c h . 8 6 , 5 1 ; 1963, c h .
88, | 3; 1964, c h . 16, $ 1; 1966, c h . 156, § 1;
1967, c h . 107, § 1; 1990, c h . 8 1 , 9 l ; 1 9 9 2 , c h .
143, ft 1; 1903, c h . 17, ft 1; 1994, c h . 13, ft 19;
!996, c h . I l l , ft 1; 1995, c h . 117, ft 1; 1995,
ch. 3 0 1 , ft 1; 1995, c h . 337, ft 1; 1995 (1st
S.S.), c h . 10, ft 1; 1996, c h . 40, ft 1; 1996, c h .
79, ft 90; 1996, c h . 2 4 1 , ftft 2 , 3 ; 1996, c h . 149,
f 1; 1999, c h . 270, ft 15.
Amendment N o t e s . — The 1995 amend
meat by ch. I l l , effective May 1, 1995, added
"or for conduct for which the defendant hem
agreed to make restitution as part of a plea
agreement* and made a related change in Subsection UXaMi).
The 1995 amendment by ch. 117, effective
May 1, 1996, inserted "the accrual of interest
from the time of sentencing" in Subsection
(lXd), changed "person adjudged guilty" to "person convicted" in Subsection (2), and added
Subsections (4XaXiii) and (4XdXiii).
The 1995 amendment by ch. 301, effective
May 1, 1995, added "and as further defined in
Subsection (4Xc)" a t the end of Subsection
UXd); rewrote Subsection (4) to revise the criteria and procedures for ordering restitution;
added Subsection (8); and made several stylistic changes.
The 1995 amendment by ch. 337, effective
April 29, 1996, added Subsection (2Kg), redesignated former Subsection (2Xg) as Subsection
2Xh), and deleted former Subsection (7XO,
requiring sentencing to the aggravated mandatory term in cases of substantial bodily injury to
children during the commission of child kidnapping or various listed child sexual assaults.
The 1995 (1st S.S.) amendment, effective
April 29, 1996, substituted "April 29, 1996" for
"May 1, 1995" in Subsection (2Xg).
The 1996 amendment by ch. 40, effective
April 29, 1996, deleted former Subsection
(2Xg), which read: "on or after April 29,1996, to
imprisonment at not less than five years and
which may be for life for an offense under Title
76, Chapter 5, P a r t 4, and Sections 76-5-301.1
•nd 76-5-302; or" and redesignated former Sub-

section (2Xh) as Subsection (2Kg); deleted
former Subsection (7), relating to resentencing
of a defendant subject to mandatory sentencing
under Subsection (6); and added Subsection (7»
The 1996 amendment by ch. 79, effective
April 29, 1996, in Subsection (2Kb) substituted
"removal or disqualification from" for "removal
from or disqualification of" and in Subsection
(4XaXi) added "Section" before "77-37-2 "
The 1996 amendment by ch. 2 4 1 , §§ 2 and I
effective April 29, 1996, added Subsection
(4XaXvii) and (4XdXiv).
The 1998 amendment, effective May 4, 1998
in Subsection (4XaXi) substituted "Subsection
(lXe)" for "Section 77-38-2" and deleted ' a n d
family member h a s the meaning a s defined in
Section 77-37-2" from the end and changed t h e
style of the internal references in Subsections
(5XcXi), (5XcXii), and (8Xc).
The 1999 amendment, effective May 3, 1999
in Subsection (6Xe), substituted "aggravating
and mitigating circumstances" for "aggravation
and mitigation" and "Sentencing Commission"
for "Commission on Criminal and J u v e n i l e J u s
tice" and made stylistic changes.
C o m p i l e r ' s N o t e s . — Laws 1995, ch 3 0 1 ,
§ 6 provides t h a t the a m e n d m e n t s in ch 117 to
Subsection (4XaXiii) shall merge into this set
tion, as amended by ch. 301, a s Subsection
(4XaXvi).
Laws 1995, ch. 337 was effective May 1, 1995
however, § 76-3-201.3 postponed the amend
ment of this section by ch. 337 until April 29,
1996.
C r o s s - R e f e r e n c e s , — Commission
on
Criminal and Juvenile Justice, § 63 25a 101 et
seq.
Division of Finance, § 63A-3-101 et seq
Removal of officers, § 77-6-1 e t seq
Restitution as condition of probation, §
18-1.
Sentence, judgment and commitment, Rule
22, R Crim.P.
Special release from city or county jail, p u r
poses, conditions and limitations, § 77 19-3 et
seq.
Uniform misdemeanor fine/bail schedule,
Code of Judicial Administration, Appx G.

77-38a-302. Restitution criteria.
(1) When a defendant is convicted of criminal activity that has resulted in
pecuniary damages, in addition to any other sentence it may impose, the court
shall order that the defendant make restitution to victims of crime as provided
in this subsection, or for conduct for which the defendant has agreed to make
restitution as part of a plea disposition. For purposes of restitution, a victim
has the meaning as defined in Subsection 77-38a-102(12) and in determining
whether restitution is appropriate, the court shall follow the criteria and
procedures as provided in Subsections (2) through (5).
(2) In determining restitution, the court shall determine complete restitution and court-ordered restitution.
(a) "Complete restitution" means restitution necessary to compensate a
victim for all losses caused by the defendant.
(b) "Court-ordered restitution" means the restitution the court having
criminal jurisdiction orders the defendant to pay as a part of the criminal
sentence at the time of sentencing.
(c) Complete restitution and court-ordered restitution shall be determined as provided in Subsection (5).
(3) If the court determines that restitution is appropriate or inappropriate
under this part, the court shall make the reasons for the decision part of the
court record.
(4) If the defendant objects to the imposition, amount, or distribution of the
restitution, the court shall at the time of sentencing allow the defendant a full
hearing on the issue.
(5) (a) For the purpose of determining restitution for an offense, the offense
shall include any criqunal conduct admitted by the defendant to the
sentencing court or to which the defendant agrees to pay restitution. A
victim of an offense that involves as an element a scheme, a conspiracy, or
a pattern of criminal activity, includes any person directly harmed by the
defendant's criminal conduct in the course of the scheme, conspiracy, or
pattern.
(b) In determining the monetary sum and other conditions for complete
restitution, the court shall consider all relevant facts, including:
(i) the cost of the damage or loss if the offense resulted in damage
to or loss or destruction of property of a victim of the offense;
(ii) the cost of necessary medical and related professional services
and devices relating to physical or mental health care, including
nonmedical care and treatment rendered in accordance with a method
of healing recognized by the law of the place of treatment;
(iii) the cost of necessary physical and occupational therapy and
rehabilitation;
(iv) the income lost by the victim as a result of the offense if the
offense resulted in bodily injury to a victim; and
(v) the cost of necessary funeral and related services if the offense
resulted in the death of a victim.
(c) In determining the monetary sum and other conditions for courtordered restitution, the court shall consider the factors listed in Subsections (5Xa) and (b) and:

(i) the financial resources of the defendant and the burden that
payment of restitution will impose, with regard to the other obligations of the defendant;
(ii) the ability of the defendant to pay restitution on an installment
basis or on other conditions to be fixed by the court;
(iii) the rehabilitative effect on the defendant of the payment of
restitution and the method of payment; and
(iv) other circumstances which the court determines may make
restitution inappropriate,
(d) The court may decline to make an order or may defer entering an
order of restitution if the court determines that the complication and
prolongation of the sentencing process, as a result of considering an order
of restitution under this subsection, substantially outweighs the need to
provide restitution to the victim.
History: C. It**, 77-48*401, enacted by
U 1M1, cau 1*7, |
ft.
tive Data*. — Laws 2001, dt 137

became effective on April 30, 2001, pursuant to
Utah Const.. Art. VI, Sec. 26.
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May 2, 2001
Adult Probation and Parole
Attn: Frank Hasy
Court Services Unit
38 West Fremont Ave.
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Re: State v. Thomas Smith; Case No. 91920225
Dear Sir.
As a supplement to the earlier letter in this case, the lead investigator in this case, Dorothy
Akins, reports that the criminal investigation unit's calculation with respect to the amount
of taxes, penalty and interest owed by this defendant - for 1995 alone - was $7,162,64, as
of April 9, 2001
You should know that the evidence in this case demonstrated that this defendant has not
filed since approximately 1988 and thus his course of conduct losses would be, and are,
tremendously higher than the aforementioned figure.
If you have any specific questions in this regard, please feel free to contact Ms. Akins at
297-3871.
Again, thank you for your attention to this matter. Please do not hesitate to contact this
office with any questions.
Sftcerely,
>

ark W. Baer
[Assistant Attorney General
Sntihl hom»s2ndt fek»tf» wp*
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Rule 2. Time.
(a) In computing any period of time, the day of the act or event from which
the designated period of time begins to run shall not be included. The last day
of the period so computed shall be included, unless it is a Saturday, a Sunday,
or a legal holiday. When a period of time prescribed or allowed is less than 11
days, intermediate Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays shall not be
included in the computation.
(b) When an act is required or allowed to be done at or within a specified
time, the court for cause shown may, at any time in its discretion:
(1) with or without motion or notice, order the period enlarged if request
therefor is made before the expiration of the period originally prescribed or as
extended by a previous order; or
(2) upon motion made after the expiration of the specified period, permit the
act to be done if there was a reasonable excuse for the failure to act; but the
court may not extend the time for taking any action under the rules applying
to a judgment of acquittal, new trial, arrest of judgment and appeal, unless
otherwise provided in these rules.
(c) A written motion other than one that may be heard ex parte and notice
of the hearing thereof shall be served not later than five days before the time
specified for the hearing, unless a different period is fixed by rule or order of
the court. When a motion is supported by affidavit, the affidavit shall be served
with the motion and opposing affidavits may be served not less than one day
before the hearing unless the court permits them to be served at a later time.
(Amended effective April 1, 1999.)
Amendment Notes. — The 1999 amendment substituted "11 days* for "seven days" in
the last sentence in Subdivision (a).

Rule 59. New trials; amendments of judgment.
(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a new trial may be granted
to all or any of the parties and on all or part of the issues, for any of the
following causes; provided, however, that on a motion for a new tnal in an
action tried without a jury, the court may open the judgment if one has been
entered, take additional testimony, amend findings of fact and conclusions of
law or make new findings and conclusions, and direct the entry of a new
judgment:
(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury or adverse party, or any
order of the court, or abuse of discretion by which either party was prevented
from having a fair trial.
(2) Misconduct of the jury; and whenever any one or more of the jurors have
been induced to assent to any general or special verdict, or to a finding on any
question submitted to them by the court, by resort to a determination by
chance or as a result of bribery, such misconduct may be proved by the affidavit
of any one of the jurors.
(3) Accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence could not have guarded
against.
(4) Newly discovered evidence, material for the party making the application, which he could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered and
produced at the trial.
(5) Excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to have been given under
the influence of passion or prejudice.
(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision, or
that it is against law.
(7) Error in law.
(b) Time for motion. A motion for a new trial shall be served not later than
10 days after the entry of the judgment.
(c) Affidavits; time for filing. When the application for a new trial is made
under Subdivision (aXD, (2), (3), or (4), it shall be supported by affidavit.
Whenever a motion for a new trial is based upon affidavits they shall be served
with the motion. The opposing party has 10 days after such service within
which to serve opposing affidavits. The time within which the affidavits or
opposing affidavits shall be served may be extended for an additional period
not exceeding 20 days either by the court for good cause shown or by the parties
by written stipulation. The court may permit reply affidavits.
(d) On initiative of court. Not later than 10 days after entry of judgment the
court of its own initiative may order a new trial for any reason for which it
might have granted a new trial on motion of a party, and in the order shall
specify the grounds therefor.
(e) Motion to alter or amend a judgment. A motion to alter or amend the
judgment shall be served not later than 10 days after entry of the judgment.
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to
Rule 59, FRCP.
Croee References. — Harmless error not
ground for new trial, Rule 61.

Juror's competency as witness as to validity
of verdict or indictment, Rules of Evidence,
Rule 606.

Rule 4. Appeal as of right: when taken.
(a) Appeal from final judgment and order In a case in which an appeal is
permitted as a matter of right from the trial court to the appellate court, the
notice of appeal required by Rule 3 shall befiledwith the clerk of the trial court
within 30 days after the date of entry of the judgment or order appealed from.
However, when a judgment or order is entered in a statutory forcible entry or
unlawful detainer action, the notice of appeal required by Rule 3 shall be filed
with the clerk of the trial court within 10 days after the date of entry of the
judgment or order appealed from.
(b) Motions post judgment or order. If a timely motion under the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure is filed in the trial court by any party (1) for judgment under
Rule 50(b); (2) under Rule 52(b) to amend or make additional findings of fact,
whether or not an alteration of the judgment would be required if the motion
is granted; (3) under Rule 59 to alter or amend the judgment; or (4) under Rule
59 for a new trial, the time for appeal for all parties shall run from the entry
0f the order denying a new trial or granting or denying any other such motion.
glinllarly, if a timely motion under the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure is
filed in the trial court under Rule 24 for a new trial, the time for appeal for all
parties shall run from the entry of the order denying a new trial. A notice of
Appeal filed before the disposition of any of the above motions shall have no
effect. A new notice of appeal must be filed within the prescribed time
measured from the entry of the order of the trial court disposing of the motion
as provided above.
(c) Filing prior to entry of judgment or order. Except as provided in
paragraph (b) of this rule, a notice of appeal filed after the announcement of a
decision, judgment, or order but before the entry of the judgment or order of
the trial court shall be treated as filed after such entry and on the day thereof.
(d) Additional or cross-appeal. If a timely notice of appeal is filed by a party,
any other party may file a notice of appeal within 14 days after the date on
which the first notice of appeal was filed, or within the time otherwise
prescribed by paragraph (a) of this rule, whichever period last expires.
(e) Extension of time to appeal. The trial court, upon a showing of excusable
neglect or good cause, may extend the time for filing a notice of appeal upon
motion filed not later than 30 days after the expiration of the time prescribed
by paragraph (a) of this rule. A motion filed before expiration of the prescribed
time may be ex parte unless the trial court otherwise requires. Notice of a
motion filed after expiration of the prescribed time shall be given to the other
parties in accordance with the rules of practice of the trial court. No extension
shall exceed 30 days past the prescribed time or 10 days from the date of entry
of the order granting the motion, whichever occurs later.
(f) Appeal by an inmate confined in an institution. If an inmate confined in
an institution files a notice of appeal in either a civil case or a criminal case, the
notice of appeal is timely filed if it is deposited in the institution's internal mail
system on or before the last day for filing. Timely filing may be shown by a
notarized statement or written declaration setting forth the date of deposit and
stating that first-class postage has been prepaid. If a notice of appeal is filed in
the manner provided in this paragraph (0, the 14-day period provided in
paragraph (d) runs from the date when the trial court receives the first notice
of appeal.
(Amended effective November 1, 1998; April 1, 1999.)
Amendment Notes. — The 1998 amendment added Subdivision (f).
The 1999 amendment deleted provisions for

motions under Rule 26 from the second sentence in Subdivision (b).
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Mark W. Baer - 5440
Assistant Attorney General
MARK L. SHURTLEFF - 4666
Attorney General
Attorneys for State of Utah
Heber Wells Building
PMB 140814
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Telephone: (801)366-0199
Facsimile: (801)366-0268
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
MOTION TO CLARIFY
SENTENCING ORDER

Plaintiff,

Criminal No. 011902002 TS

v.
THOMAS H. SMITH
DOB: 01/16/43
Defendant.

JL^

COMES NOW, the State of Utah, by and through Mark W. Baer, Assistant Attorney
General and hereby request that the Court in the above cited case clarify the Sentence,
Judgment, Commitment Order entered in the above cited case. In support thereof, the State
notes as follows:
1. On or about September 7,2001, the defendant in this case was sentenced on two
tax fraud convictions arising out of an earlier trial on those charges. See Judgment/Sentence
attached hereto as Exhibit A.

3. No restitution amount appears in the Judgment/Sentence in this case.
2. However; as part of the sentencing request, the State had asked for a criminal
restitution order in the minimum amount of $6,105.94, which amount represents the amount
that the defendant owed as of the investigation of his case in August, 1999.The State renews
that request at this time and asked that it be memorialized as part of the record in this case.
3. In addition, the Judgment specifically requires the defendant to file returns "for all
years requested" and that the defendant must "make any future returns." However, the Order
does not specifically state the previous years nor that the defendant must file legitimate
returns with supporting documentation.
4. Notwithstanding the language pointed out in paragraph 3 above, since the time of
sentencing, officials at the Utah State Tax Commission have reported that Mr. Smith has
already stated that he will not so file previous year returns.
5. In light of the state of the Judgment/Sentence and the defendant's posture in this
case, the State feels it is now imperative that this Court enter a very specific Order in these
regards. Even discounting the reports from the Tax Commission, the specification of the
Court's previous orders in this regard do not change anything previously ordered by the Court.
6. Therefore the State requests that this Court enter a further Order which would further
clarify and specify the Order and Judgment already ordered in this case that the defendant:
(1) File all past Utah State returns from 1990 to present;
(2) That the filings must account for income and expenses of the defendant;
2

(3) That the defendant must present supporting documentation with such returns;
(4) That Restitution is hereby set at $6,105.94, as of August, 1999, for purposes of this
criminal case only; howeverthis noted amount does not bind the Utah State Tax Commission,
and further only related to tax year 1995.
Respectfully Submitted,

MarklW. Baer "
Assistant Attorney General

•

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and exact copy of the foregoing, postage prepaid,
to the following:
Ron Fujino
Salt Lake Legal Defender Association
Stand-By Counsel for Defendant
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Thomas H. Smith
1301 WHBR
Vernal, Utah 84078
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THIRD DISTRICT COURT SALT LAKE COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT

vs.

Case No: 991920225 FS

THOMAS HOWARD SMITH,
Defendant.

Judge:
Date:

RAYMOND S. UNO
September 7, 2001

PRESENT
Clerk:
marcyt
Prosecutor: MARK W BAER
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): RONALD S FUJINO
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: January 16, 1943
Video
Tape Number:
1:08
CHARGES
1. TAX EVASION - 3rd
Plea: Guilty 2. TAX EVASION - 2nd
Plea: Guilty -

Degree Felony
Disposition: 04/11/2001 {Guilty Plea}
Degree Felony
Disposition: 04/11/2001 {Guilty Plea}

SENTENCE PRISON
Based on the defendant's conviction of TAX EVASION a 3rd Degree
Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not
to exceed five years in the Utah State Prison.
The prison term is suspended.
Based on the defendant's conviction of TAX EVASION a 2nd Degree
Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not
less than one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah State
Prison.
The prison term is suspended.

Page 1

Case No: 991920225
Date:
Sep 07, 2001

SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE
Counts are to run concurrent.

SENTENCE FINE
Charge # 1

Fine:
Suspended:
Surcharge:
Due:

$1000.00
$0.00
$459.46
$1000.00

Charge # 2

Fine:
Suspended:
Surcharge:
Due:

$2500.00
$0.00
$1148.65
$2500.00

Total Fine:
Total Suspended:
Total Surcharge:
Total Principal Due:

$3500.00
$0
$1608.11
$3500.00
Plus Interest

ORDER OF PROBATION
The defendant is placed on probation for 36 month(s).
Probation is to be supervised by Adult Probation & Parole.
Defendant is to pay a fine of 3500.00 which includes the surcharge.
Interest may increase the final amount due.
PROBATION CONDITIONS
Usual and ordinary conditions required by the Department of Adult
Probation & Parole.
Defendant is to cooperate with the Tax Commission and file returns
for all years requested.
Defendant is to make any future tax filings.
Defendant is to complete 500 hours community service doing service
approved by APPD.
Defendant is to pay a fine of $3500 which includes the surcharge.
Page 2

Case No: 991920225
Date:
Sep 07, 2001
A review hearing is set for March 15, 2002 at 8:30 a.m.
Defendant is to keep the State informed of his address at all
times.
REVIEW HEARING is scheduled.
Date: 03/15/2002
Time: 08:30 a.m.
Location: Third Floor - W37
THIRD DISTRICT COURT
450 SOUTH STATE STREET
SLC, UT 84111-1860
Before Judge: MICHAEL K. BURTON
Dated this

RAYMOl
District
In compliance with the Americans with Piaabili€S^^^jhtj^Kdividuals
needing special accommodations (including auxiliary ccflflmunicative
aids and services) during this proceeding should call Third
District Court-Salt Lake at 238-7058 at least three working days
prior to the proceeding. The general information phone number is
(801)238-7300.

NWMSTIICTCOUir
Third Judicial District
By: MARK W. BAER #5440
Assistant Attorney General
MARK SHURTLEFF #4666
Attorney General
Attorney For The State of Utah
Heber Wells Building
PMB 140814
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Telephone: (801)366-0199
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

ORDER
Criminal No. 011002002 TS

v.
THOMAS H. SMITH
DOB: 01/16/43
Defendant.

ORDER
The defendant is hereby Ordered as follows in addition to anything already
ordered in this case:
(1) File all past Utah State returns from 1990 to present;
(2) That the filings must account for income and expenses of the defendant;
(3) That the defendant must present supporting documentation with such returns;

5

(4) That Restitution is hereby set at $6,105.94, for purposes of this criminal case only,
but that this amount does not bind the Utah State Tax Commission, and further only related
to tax year 1995.
DONE IN COURT this

^

day

of ^ y / b

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and exact copy of the foregoing, postage prepaid,
to the following:
Ron Fujino
Salt Lake Legal Defender Association
Stand-By Counsel for Defendant
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Thomas H. Smith
1301 WHBR
Vernal, Utah 84078
Mark W. Baer
Assistant Attorney General
Heber Wells Building
PMB 140814
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
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N L U DISTRICT COURT
Third Jujttotol District
Thomas Smith
1301 WH6R
Vernal, Utah 84078
OtputyOtrtc

THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Case No. 991920225
Plaintiff,
Objection to Proposed Order
v.
Thomas Smith,
Defendant.

Defendant, Thomas Smith, hereby responds, objects to and moves the Court to
summarily deny the Plaintiffs proposed order on grounds that the Court lacks jurisdiction to
grant the relief requested (no hearing is needed) and sets forth his reasons below.
FACTS
1.

Defendant was charged with one count of tax evasion a third degree felony for the year
1995.

2.

Defendant was charged with one count of tax evasion a second degree felony for the
year 1995.

3.

Defendant was not charged with any tax crime whatsoever for any year other than 1995.

4.

Defendant's conviction was only for the year 1995 and for no other year.

Objictlon to ordtr
Cast No 991920225
i 1 of 11

5.

No evidence or testimony was presented at trial regarding any filing requirement for any
year other than 1995, nor was the jury asked to determine a filing requirement for any
year other than 1995.

6.

Therefore, there was no determination regarding any filing requirement for any year
other than 1995.

7.

Plaintiff seeks an summary order requiring Defendant to file tax returns for years other
than the year 1995.
DISCUSSION
The only year at issue in the instant matter is 1995. Plaintiff had more than ample

opportunity to bring forth charges that Defendant had a filing requirement for years other than
1995 and to set forth the bets on which Plaintiff believed that Defendant was required to file.
Plaintiff did not bring forth such charges, nor did Plaintiff set forth such bets at trial.
Therefore, Plaintiff is estopped from bringing forth such request as a summary proceeding and
the Court is estopped from granting such request. Further, because such facts are not before
the Court, the Court lacks subject matter and in personum jurisdiction over such matters.
By making the request that the Court order Defendant to file such returns for years other
than 1995, Plaintiff is asking the Court to relieve Plaintiff of its requirement to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that Defendant is required to file for a year other than 1995. The Court lacks
jurisdiction to make such an order in the absence of a determination by a trier of fact that such

Objection to order
Case No 991920225
p t g t 2 o f 1 1 pages

returns are required.
The most important issues established in the instant matter are that whether or not the
Defendant is required to file a tax return and pay a tax is an issue of fact not an issue of law.
To determine issues of fact requires a trial at which plaintiff sets forth the evidence and
testimony and a trier of fact makes a determination on the basis of the facts set forth, and that
failure to file a tax return and pay a tax is not a civil matter, but, is a criminal matter which
requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

The Plaintiff, by not bringing a charge of failing

to file and pay for years other than 1995 has forfeited itsrightto require Defendant to file and
pay for years other than 1995.
Not withstanding such requirement, Plaintiff seeks to circumvent Defendant'srightto
due process and to have a trier of fact make a determination that Defendant is required to file
for years other than 1995, by asking the Court to summarily order the Defendant tofiletax
returns for years other than that which the Defendant stands convected of. If the Court has
jurisdiction to summarily order the Defendant tofilefor years other than 1995, then the Court
had jurisdiction to summarily order the Defendant tofilefor 1995 and no trial would have been
necessary. The Court has no such authority.
Years ago the State of Utah issued a Writ of Mandate to individuals that the Tax
Commission fett should file tax returns (a civH summary proceeding requiring a lower civil
evidentiary requirement). In this process the court would summarily order the individual to file

Objection to order
C A M No 991920225
page 3 of 11 pages

and jail him/her for contempt if such return was not filed. This procedure was found to be
defective, in that it constituted a denial of the individuals right to due process, because as
established by the instant matter failure to file is a criminal matter. It cannot be determined on
the basis of a civil proceeding and the lower civil evidentiary requirement. Nor, can it be
determined on the basis of a summary proceeding in the absence of a trial. The determination
of the requirement to file is highly fact sensitive. Since the requirement to file is criminal
proceeding, it requires a criminal adjudication and a criminal evidentiary requirement. As
stated above the Defendant is not charged with nor has the Defendant been found beyond a
reasonable doubt, by a trier of fact, to be required to file for any year other than 1995. In the
absence of such a finding beyond a reasonable doubt by a trier of tact, this Court lacks
jurisdiction to summarily order the Defendant to file returns for any year other than 1995.
Therefore, numbers 1,2,3, must be denied for lack jurisdiction.
Utah Code Annotated 59-7-517(2) requires that before any proceeding against a
taxpayer is commenced the taxpayer must be noticed. The Court should take judicial notice
that prior to trial no notice of a tax due was sent to Defendant, nor was any exhibit or testimony
presented to the jury that a notice was sent. The attached Notice of Deficiency, dated
September 20,2001, is the first notice the Defendant has received from the Tax Commission
regarding taxes due for 1995. Thus the instant case was commenced in violation of Title 59-7517(2) and the Court lacks jurisdiction to proceed or to enforce any judgment of guilty and/or

Objection to order
Case No. 991920225
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to order the Defendant to do anything. Pursuant to the attached Notice of Deficiency the Court
lacks jurisdiction to order the Defendant to file for the year 1995 because such order would
circumvent the Defendants due process rights to appeal the deficiency as noted on the
attached Notice of Deficiency accordingly.
As to item number 4, the aforesaid Notice of Deficiency alleges a deficiency of
$8,004.39 for the year 1995. The Court will note that said Deficiency notices the Defendant
that he has the right to 1) Request a Division Conference or 2) to file a Petition for
Redetermination within 30 days of the mailing date of this letter. If the Court were to grant the
proposed order as to item number 4 such order would circumvent and deny Defendant his
appealrightsas granted by instruction number 2 on the Deficiency Notice. Further, such order
would negate the Notice of Deficiency in its entirety and the Defendant's right to due process
under the terms and conditions of the Notice of Deficiency. Additionally, the issuance of the
attached Notice of Deficiency takes jurisdiction to determine the amount of tax due away from
this Court and places it squarely within the jurisdiction of State Tax Commission appeals
division.
Thus, as shown above the Court lacks jurisdiction to grant the proposed order and/or
to proceed or to enforce any judgment of guilty and/or to order the Defendant to do anything
and must therefore and can SUMMARILY deny the proposed order in its entirety and no
hearing is needed.

Objection to ordtr
Cast No. 991920225
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Dated September 26,2001
/s/ Thomas Smith
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that I have served a copy of the foregoing by fax on the following:
Third District Court; Mark W. Bear Assistant Attorney General, 160 E. 300 S. 6th Floor, Salt
Lake City, Utah 84114; Ron Fujino, 424 E. 500 S. Ste 300, Salt Lake City, UT, 84111.
Dated: September 26,2001

Is/ Thomas Smith
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PARTS
RESTITUTION REQUIREMENTS
77-38a-301. Restitution — Convicted defendant may be
required to pay.
In a criminal action, the court may require a convicted defendant to make
restitution.
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